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Abstract
My thesis consists of three chapters that contribute to the study of input misallo-
cation and TFP growth in China.
In Chapter 2, I compare the misallocation of intermediate goods to those of cap-
ital and labor, which have been extensively studied in the literature. To measure
misallocation, I compute the dispersion of marginal products of intermediate goods
across firms, and the potential output gains by eliminating this dispersion in China
Industrial Enterprise Survey (CIES) data. Although the within-industry disper-
sion of marginal products of intermediates is smaller than that of capital and labor,
gross output and value added gains from reallocating intermediate goods are 6 and
14 times those from capital and labor reallocations. If intermediate goods, capi-
tal and labor are reallocated to equalize their marginal products, the total value
added gain in the CIES is 550%, much greater than the 98% obtained under the
value added approach in the literature (i.e. Hsieh and Klenow, 2009). This sug-
gests that with its 74% revenue share and input complementarity, distortions and
frictions through intermediate goods could be a promising channel to account for
sizable misallocation in China’s data. I further find suggestive evidence of pre-
order friction: intermediate goods need half a year to pre-order, which gives rise
to borrowing constraints in paying for intermediates. Similar to capital, marginal
products of intermediates are found to be more dispersed among potentially con-
strained firms with low net worth, as one would expect if borrowing constraints
exist.
Motivated by the findings in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 quantifies the novel role of
pre-order friction and borrowing constraints on intermediate goods in accounting
for misallocation in the CIES data (Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Brandt, Van Biese-
broeck, and Zhang, 2012). With a gross output production function, I incorporate
intermediate goods frictions into the firm investment model of Cooper and Halti-
wanger (2006). Firms order and prepay for a fraction of intermediate goods one
period in advance (pre-order), and face one borrowing constraint on capital and
intermediate goods. Firms also face capital adjustment costs. I measure misallo-
cation by the potential gross output gain as a percentage of actual gross output,
if intermediate goods, capital and labor are hypothetically reallocated to equalize
marginal products across firms. Over 1998-2007, gross output misallocation in the
CIES data averages 140 percent. The model accounts for around 70 percent of
this misallocation, when calibrated to key moments in firm-level debt, productiv-
ity and market share distribution in the CIES data. Half of the misallocation in
i
the model is attributed to intermediate goods frictions: 34 percent from borrowing
constraints, and 16 percent from pre-order. While borrowing constraints on capi-
tal induce small misallocation, capital adjustment costs account for the other half.
Largermisallocation with intermediate goods frictions thanwithout arises from its
large gross output revenue share and recurrent need of financing. This tightens
the borrowing constraint and interrupts the self-financing mechanism for capital
accumulation. Further, as in Chapter 2 for the data, I find that value added ap-
proach in literature also underestimates misallocation by ignoring misallocation of
intermediate goods for the model. The importance of intermediate goods frictions
in misallocation could be applicable to other countries with an underdeveloped fi-
nancial system.
Chapter 4 decomposes China’s fast aggregatemanufacturing productivity growth
into firm-level technological growth, intensive reallocation of inputs across existing
firms and extensive reallocations through net entry. Following Baily, Hulten, and
Campbell (1992)’s approach of aggregate productivity decomposition, I find that
extensive reallocation accounts for 93% and 144% of 5-year aggregate productivity
growth in 1998-2003 and 2002-2007 in the CIES. In contrast, intensive reallocation
contributes -10% and -93% to the growth. These estimates are however biased by
a left-censoring problem, since CIES does not survey non state owned firms with
sales less than 5 million yuan. I propose a methodology accordingly to recover the
three sources of growth in China’s manufacturing sector. I find that when China’s
data is taken as the manufacturing universe, the role of extensive reallocation in
aggregate productivity growth is overstated by a quarter to two thirds during 1998-
2003 and 2002-2007. Most of the overstated magnitude in extensive reallocation
is picked up by the intensive reallocation among existing firms. Compared to U.S.,
intensive reallocation in China’s manufacturing sector is still smaller, but larger
than that directly implied in the CIES. This also indicates that the left-censoring
problem in other countries should be taken into accountwhen analyzingmicro-level
sources of aggregate productivity growth across countries.
Keywords: Intermediate Goods, Gross Output Misallocation, Value Added Mis-
allocation, Pre-Order, Borrowing Constraints, Left-Censoring, TFP Growth, Tech-
nological Growth, Intensive Reallocation, Extensive Reallocation
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Chapter 1
Introduction
China’s manufacturing sector has undergone several major institutional changes
during 1998-2007. These changes include privatization of some state owned firms,
trade liberalization with accession toWTO and financial market reforms (Xu, 2011;
Zhu, 2012). There is a growing consensus that these reforms have facilitated re-
allocation of inputs and increased aggregate productivity (e.g. Yu, 2010; Song,
Storesletten, and Zilibotti, 2011; Tombe and Zhu, 2015). However, there is also
evidence that substantial misallocation, defined as the gap between actual and po-
tential output when marginal products of inputs are equalized, still exists and is
greater than that in the more efficient benchmark of U.S.. (Hsieh and Klenow,
2009; Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang, 2012). Two natural questions arise
given these facts. What frictions or distortions could quantitatively account for the
still existing misallocation in China after these reforms? How are these reforms
reflected in the reallocation across firms during this time period?
To answer the first question, Chapter 2 of this thesis studies the misallocation
of the third input – intermediate goods and its quantitative magnitude in China
Industrial Enterprise Survey (CIES) data. Because of its 74% gross output rev-
enue share, intermediate goods frictions are promising to account for misalloca-
tion. Chapter 3 thus builds on the suggestive evidence of pre-order friction and
borrowing constraints on intermediate goods found in Chapter 2, and quantifies
their roles in accounting for the substantial misallocation in China.
For the second question, earlier studies either focus on a particular reform,1 or
use the left-censored CIES data to see the total effect of reforms (Van Biesebroeck,
2008; Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang, 2012; Ding, Guariglia, and Harris,
2016). Since 80% of manufacturing firms with sales less than 5 million yuan are
1For example, there is trade liberalization in Yu (2010), privatization of state owned firms in
Song, Storesletten, and Zilibotti (2011).
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not included in the CIES, Chapter 4 corrects the left-censoring and recovers the
true reallocations in China’s manufacturing sector.
The case of China is interesting for two reasons. First, persistent misallocation
exists despite of policy reforms in many developing countries (Moll, 2014; Buera
and Shin, 2013). Using Chinese firm-level data to explore intermediate goods mis-
allocation and reallocation in its manufacturing sector could help to understand
misallocation in other countries, e.g. India and Mexico. Second, as the second
largest economy since 2010, China’s current and potential growth from improving
allocation efficiency is closely related to productivity growth and welfare in other
countries (Di Giovanni, Levchenko, and Zhang, 2014; Hsieh and Ossa, 2016).
My thesis takes a firm as the production unit, which uses capital, labor and
intermediate goods to produce gross output under some technology. Perhaps moti-
vated by the macro approach to study cross-country GDP differences, the misallo-
cation literature has focused on value added output, and studied misallocation in
capital and labor. The magnitude of misallocation in intermediate goods have not
been explored, despite its largest gross output revenue share (over 50%) across
countries (Jones, 2011). Chapter 2 of my dissertation documents intermediate
goods misallocation in the CIES data. I explore (i) whether there exists misalloca-
tion of intermediate goods; (ii) what frictions potentially account for misallocated
intermediate goods; (iii) bias on themagnitude of potential value added output gain
(i.e. Hsieh and Klenow, 2009) by neglecting intermediate goods misallocation.
I find that although the dispersion of the marginal products of intermediates
is smaller than those of capital and labor, the gross output and value added gains
from intermediate goods reallocation are about 6 and 14 times those from capital
and labor, respectively. I also find suggestive evidences of pre-order friction and
borrowing constraints on intermediates in the CIES data. The time period from
ordering intermediates to receiving sales revenue lasts about 6 months. Further,
the dispersion of marginal products of intermediates is higher among firms with
low net worth. This is consistent with borrowing constraints, as one would expect
more dispersion of marginal products among constrained firms.
Misallocation of intermediate goods implies that the value added approach in
the literature may underestimate the magnitude of misallocation. Specifically, the
value added approach nets intermediates from gross output and computes value
added productivity. Capital and labor are then reallocated to firms with highest
value added productivities to equalize their marginal products across firms. Under
this approach, the total value added gain in the CIES is 98%, much smaller than
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550% when all three inputs are reallocated simultaneously to firms with high-
est gross output productivities. This is because first, the value added approach
neglects the extra output gain from reallocating intermediates via input comple-
mentarity. Secondly, it also biases the misallocation since firm-level value added
productivity no longer reflects its gross output productivity.
Motivated by the suggestive evidence of pre-order friction and borrowing con-
straints for intermediates in Chapter 2, Chapter 3 quantifies how much these two
frictions can account for misallocation in China. I incorporate pre-order and bor-
rowing constraints on intermediate goods into the standard firm investment model
of Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). The model also features borrowing constraints
on capital (Midrigan and Xu, 2014; Moll, 2014; Bai, Lu, and Tian, 2016 among
many others) and capital adjustment costs (Asker, Collard-Wexler, and De Loecker,
2014). In the quantitative analysis, the model is calibrated to match key moments
in firm-level debt and productivity, as well as the market share distribution over
firm age groups in the CIES data over 1998-2007.
I find that the model generates substantial misallocation and accounts for 69%
of measured misallocation in the CIES data. Counterfactual experiments suggest
that borrowing constraints on intermediates and on capital, pre-order on inter-
mediates and capital adjustment costs account for 23%, less than 1%, 11% and
35% of misallocation in the CIES data, respectively. In the model, borrowing con-
straints on intermediate goods generate much larger misallocation than that on
capital. This small impact of financial frictions on capital investment is consistent
with Midrigan and Xu (2014) and Moll (2014), due to persistent firm-level produc-
tivities and firms’ ability to save such that the stationary distribution have few
constrained firms. With intermediate goods borrowing constraints, capital financ-
ing is crowded out directly intra period, and also indirectly through a lower level
of net worth in the future. This slows capital accumulation and leaves more firms
constrained.
While Chapter 2 and 3 focus on average misallocation during 1998-2007, Chap-
ter 4 studies the dynamic reallocations of inputs across firms in China through
the lens of aggregate productivity growth. Following the U.S. aggregate produc-
tivity decomposition literature (Baily, Hulten, and Campbell, 1992; Foster, Halti-
wanger, and Krizan, 2001), I decompose 5-year growth in gross output weighted
firm-level productivity in the CIES into: technological growth, intensive realloca-
tion and extensive reallocation. Specifically, technological growth measures the
average firm-level productivity growth. The intensive reallocation measures real-
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locations among existing firms, while the extensive one measures whether more
productive entrants replace less productive exiters over time.
A key innovation of this chapter is to take the left-censoring of the CIES into
account when implementing the decomposition. Unlike U.S. census data, the CIES
data excludes non state owned firms with sales less than 5million yuan, and conse-
quently misses 80% of manufacturing firms in China. I develop amethod to recover
the true technological growth, intensive and extensive reallocation in China’s man-
ufacturing sector. I show this possibility under several assumptions of firm-level
productivity process, closure behavior and the shape of sales distribution, using
the CIES and several aggregate statistics about firms with sales less than 5 mil-
lion yuan.
Aggregate manufacturing productivity grows 18% in 1998-2003 and 16% in
2002-2007 in the CIES. If one takes the CIES data as the manufacturing universe,
the fraction accounted by extensive reallocation is correspondingly 93% and 144%,
and that by intensive reallocation is -10% and -93%. However, the left-censoring
problem biases the extensive margin upwards and the intensive margin down-
wards. In the decomposition that corrects for the left-censoring, extensive real-
location accounts for 74% of aggregate productivity growth in 1998-2003 and 86%
in 2002-2007, while intensive reallocation accounts for 24% and -40%, respectively.
Two sources account for the bias. First, manufacturing firms with sales less than 5
million cutoff are neglected in the former exercise. These firms increase aggregate
productivity through intensive reallocation and technological growth. Second, in-
cumbent firms cross the 5million cutoff aremis-classified as entrants and exiters in
the CIES, which consequently mis-attributes some of the intensive reallocation in
the manufacturing sector to extensive reallocation in the former exercise. Overall,
intensive reallocation in China’s manufacturing sector is still less than that in the
U.S. manufacturing sector, but larger than what is directly implied in the CIES
data. The extensive reallocation during 1998-2007 remains to be China’s main
driving force of aggregate productivity growth after correcting the left-censoring
problem.
My thesis offer several policy implications. First, despite its fast growth, China’s
financial underdevelopment may distort allocation of intermediate goods as well
as capital investment across firms, and therefore causes aggregate output loss.
When this intermediate goods channel is taken into account, there could be more
efficiency enhancing from the ongoing financial market reforms in China, e.g. a
better enforcement of bankruptcy law, construction of personal credit system and
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interest rate liberalization. Second, institutional reforms during 1998-2007 de-
crease the magnitude of gross output misallocation, consistent with earlier studies
about their positive role in improving allocation. In particular, Chapter 3 suggests
that the potential gross output gain decreases from 1.68 in 1998 to 1.24 in 2007.
Chapter 4 finds that privatization of state owned firms increases aggregate pro-
ductivity by 0.27% over 5 years. Third, according to the cross-country analysis in
Asturias, Hur, Kehoe, and Ruhl (2017), the net entry margin from decreased entry
costs and trade liberalization in early 2000s is likely to be exhausted when China
transits into a lower growth regime. Therefore, reforms facilitating reallocation of
inputs among existing firms may provide a more sustainable path for productivity
growth in China. Example reforms of this type potentially include financial mar-
ket reforms and lowering domestic trade costs (Young, 2000; Tombe and Zhu, 2015;
Yang, 2016).
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Chapter 2
Intermediate Goods Misallocation
in Chinese Firm-level Data
2.1 Introduction
Substantial measured misallocation of inputs across firms has been documented
using the China Industrial Enterprise Survey (CIES) data (e.g. Hsieh and Klenow,
2009; Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang, 2012). A number of studies follow the
seminal paper Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and quantify the magnitude of output
(value added) gain if capital and labor are reallocated to firms with highest value
added productivities. This value added approach implicitly assumes that inter-
mediate goods are efficiently allocated across firms, which is a potentially strong
assumption. Since intermediate goods input has the largest gross output revenue
share, there could be a large bias in measured misallocation when intermediate
goods are misallocated.
This chapter quantifies the magnitude of misallocation of intermediate goods
in the CIES data. Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), I define misallocation as
the gap between actual output and potential output when the marginal products
of inputs are hypothetically equalized across firms as in a static firm model. Un-
like Hsieh and Klenow (2009), I use gross output (rather than value added) as the
outputmeasure so as to quantify the gross output misallocation. I employ twomea-
sures to quantify intermediate goods misallocation in the CIES 1998-2007. First, I
document the dispersion of marginal products of intermediates across firms within
2-digit China Industrial Classification code industries (3-digit NAICS equivalent).
Second, I compute the potential gross output and value added gains by equalizing
marginal products of intermediates across firms within 2-digit industries, holding
capital and labor at the firm-level as observed.
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These measures are compared to those for capital and labor, in order to investi-
gate the relative importance of intermediates in accounting formisallocation. I find
that althoughmarginal products of intermediates are less dispersed, the gross out-
put and value added gains from intermediate goods reallocation are about 6 and 14
times of those from capital and labor reallocations. This sizable output gain from
intermediate goods reallocation is consistent with its highest gross output revenue
share. Thus, frictions or distortions on intermediates, if there is any, could be a
promising channel to account for the substantial misallocation in China’s data.
The measured misallocation of intermediates across firms results in a bias in
the standard value added approach in quantifying misallocation. Specifically, the
value added approach in the literature nets intermediates from gross output and
computes value added productivity under a value added production function. The
magnitude of misallocation is to quantify the total value added gain when capital
and labor are reallocated to firms with the highest value added productivities. This
approach underestimates misallocation, since it first neglects the potential output
gain from reallocating intermediates. Unless intermediate goods are perfectly sub-
stitutable or additively separable with value added bundle, input complementarity
implies that output increases due to not only reallocation of intermediates, but also
the reallocation of capital and labor along with intermediates. Secondly, it may
also bias the misallocation since the value added productivity no longer reflects
firm-level gross output productivity.
To quantify this bias, I compute total value added gain in the CIES by two ap-
proaches of reallocation. One is the value added approach in the literature. The
second is the gross output approach, i.e. I quantify the gross output and value
added gains by reallocating capital, labor and intermediates simultaneously to
firms with the highest gross output productivities. Results suggest that the first
approach gives 98% total value added gain in the CIES, while the second approach
gives 550%. In other words, the value added approach underestimates misalloca-
tion substantially when intermediate goods are misallocated.
I further explore what intermediate goods frictions can potentially account for
the intermediate goods misallocation. I find suggestive evidences of two frictions,
pre-order friction and borrowing constraints on intermediates financing in theCIES
data. First, unlike what is implicitly assumed in the value added approach, inter-
mediate goods choice is not static. In practice, it takes time for firms to pre-order
intermediates, organize production, sell goods and receive sales revenue. The en-
tire process lasts about 6 months in the CIES. This also creates borrowing needs
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for working capital if firms have insufficient internal funds.
Therefore, I investigate whether firms with low net worth are constrained in
financing intermediates. Using capital stock as the proxy of net worth, I find that
the dispersion of marginal products of intermediates is 50% higher among firms
in the bottom quartile of capital distribution, compared to those in the top quar-
tile. A similar observation holds for the case of capital, which is consistent with a
story that financial frictions not only hamper capital investment, but also distort
intermediate goods choice at the firm-level.
This chapter is related to a growing literature on capital and labor misalloca-
tion. Hsieh and Klenow (2009) documented how reallocations of capital and labor
across firms can increase total value added in Chinese and Indian firm-level data.
For labor misallocation, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Boedo and Mukoyama
(2012), Da-Rocha, Tavares, and Restuccia (2015) and Mukoyama and Osotime-
hin (2016) studied how labor firing costs hinder labor reallocation and lower the
level and growth of aggregate productivity. The strand of capital misallocation
is more broad and connects to the literature on financial development and cross-
country GDP differences. The most popular explanations for capital misallocation
are adjustment costs and borrowing constraints. These studies include Bartles-
man, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2013), Asker, Collard-Wexler, and De Loecker
(2014), Moll (2014), Buera and Shin (2013), Midrigan and Xu (2014), Bai, Lu, and
Tian (2016) etc. Instead of capital and labor misallocation, this chapter investi-
gates misallocation of the third input, intermediate goods. I find that intermediate
goods are the most important input to account for sizable misallocation in China’s
data, consistent with its highest gross output revenue share
This chapter is also related to the work on misallocation with intermediate
goods. Dias, Marques, and Richmond (2016) and Bils, Klenow, and Ruane (2017)
also used gross output production function and computed gross output misalloca-
tion by reallocating intermediate goods along with capital and labor in Portugal
and Indian firm-level data. While these studies focus on the impact of gross output
misallocation on TFP and its measurement problem, this chapter focuses solely on
the empirical fact on intermediate goods misallocation and its potential explana-
tions. The argument about the bias of using value added approach is also novel in
the literature.
The rest of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the data
source. Section 3 measures intermediate goods misallocation, compared to capital
and labor misallocation. Section 4 quantifies the bias of value added approach
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in quantifying misallocation. Section 5 investigates two suggestive intermediate
goods frictions and Section 6 concludes.
2.2 Data
My three chapters are all based on the China Industrial Enterprise Survey (CIES)
from 1998 to 2007, which has been extensively used in the literature (see, e.g. Hsieh
and Klenow, 2009; Brandt, Van Biesebrock, and Zhang, 2014; Bai, Lu, and Tian,
2016). For this reason, this section also serves as a data introduction for the fol-
lowing two chapters.
The CIES covers all state owned manufacturing firms, and non state owned
manufacturing firms with sales more than 5 million yuan every year before 2007
(approximately 800 hundred thousand U.S. dollars). The observation of production
units in the CIES data are firms, not establishments. In 2004, 95% of firms have
only one establishment. According to National Bureau of Statistics, starting from
2007, the 5 million threshold sales is required for both state owned and non state
owned firms to be included in the CIES data. In 2011, the threshold sales increases
to 20 million yuan.
The dataset combines firm-level information on balance sheets, income and cash
flow statements. Variables of interest in this thesis include gross output (sales),
book value of capital, employment, wage bill, intermediate goods cost, birth years,
inventory, account receivables, ownership and industries (see Table 2.1 for variable
definitions). Industries in this dataset are classified according to the 4-digit China
Industrial Classification code (CIC). In all, there are 544 4-digit CIC industries,
and 29 2-digit CIC (3-digit NAICS equivalent) industries in the manufacturing
sector.1
To track firms over time, I construct an unbalanced panel from 1998 to 2007
using firm information. Specifically, firm i at t and firm j at t + 1 are matched
sequentially according to registration I.D., name of the firm, name of legal rep-
resentatives, phone number, industry and main products, following the method
of Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012). Since ownership is not used for
matching, a privatized SOE would be matched with the same firm in later years if
any of the matching criteria is unchanged. For merges, unfortunately, this dataset
1Example 4-digit industries are manufacture of candy and confectionery, manufacture of leather
shoes, manufacture of biochemistry pesticide and manufacture of metal forming machine to name
a few. See Table A.1 in appendix for a full list of 2-digit CIC industries.
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Table 2.1: Variable Definitions in CIES Data
Variable Definition
Registration ID Unique 9-digit identifying number upon a firm’s regis-
tration
Ownership (SOE) Firms with Registration Classification 110, 120, 141,
143, 145, 151 (see Holz, 2013)
Ownership (NonSOE) Firms with Registration Classification 130, 142, 149,
159, 160, 171, 172, 173, 174, 190, 219, 220, 230, 240,
310, 320, 330, 340 (see Holz, 2013)
Birth year First year that a firm operates. This could be earlier
than the registration year. If an SOE firm switches to
non state owned, the birth year is that of the old firm
Industry 4-digit China Industrial Classification code GB/T 4754-
1994 before 2003, GB/T 4754-2002 between 2003 and
2011, and GB/T 4754-2011 since 2012
Gross Output Market value of finished and semi-finished products that
are produced in the calendar year
Book Value of Capital Purchased value of fixed asset net accumulated depreci-
ation
Employment Average employment over the calender year; includes
both full-time and part-time employment
Total Wage Payable Total wage bill for all workers, including full-time and
part-time. Benefits are not included
Intermediate Inputs Value of raw materials, energy and semi-finished prod-
ucts purchased outside of a firm and used in production
in the calendar year
Inventory Value of rawmaterials and semi-finished products to use
in the next production stage, and finished products to
sell
Account Receivables Value of sales (not restricted to sales in the calendar
year) to be collected from buyers.
Sources: National Bureau of Statistics at Shanghai, http://www.stats-sh.gov.cn/, and Beijing
http://www.bjstats.gov.cn/
cannot distinguish it from entry and exit.2
With this panel data, the real capital stock of firm i at time t, kit, is constructed
2If firm i and j merge at time t + 1 and the new company uses any of the above matching criteria
as firm i at t + 1, firm j would be viewed as an exit. If the new firm at t + 1 cannot be matched with
i or j in any criteria, firms i and j are viewed as exits and this new firm is viewed as an entry.
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using a perpetual inventory method
kit = (1 − δ)kit−1 + ∆Book Value CapitalitCapital Goods Deflator (Base Year=1998) ∗ 100 (2.1)
The initial real capital stock is the book value of capital at t − 1 if the opening year
of firm i is t − 1. For firms established before 1998, I follow Brandt, Van Biese-
broeck, and Zhang (2012) and set the firm level real capital stock proportional to
total real capital stock of the province it is located, according to the firm’s fraction
of provincial nominal capital stock. Real capital stock at the province level is eas-
ier to compute because of longer time series in National Bureau of Statistics (NBS)
yearbooks. In further calculating firm-level productivity, gross output and inter-
mediate goods are deflated using industry-specific deflators. Wages are deflated
using CPI from NBS.
Table 2.2 presents summary statistics of themain variables. During 1998-2007,
the number of manufacturing firms in the CIES more than doubled, from 147,690
to 304,599 with an annual growth rate of 8.4%. This growth rate is much higher
than the 1% annual growth of manufacturing firms in U.S. during 1977 to 1987
(U.S. Business Dynamic Statistics). Further, the composition of ownership also
changed dramatically in the CIES. Fraction of non state owned firms increased
from 38% in 1998 to 94% in 2007. Similar trends exist for their employment and
gross output shares in the CIES data.
Compared to state owned firms, non state owned firms are on average smaller
in employment. This size gap get widened during 1998-2007. An average SOE firm
is about 23% larger than an average non state owned firm in 1998, and 89% larger
in 2007. For gross output, an average state owned firm is 71% of an average non
state owned firm in 1998, but increases to 1.89 in 2007. Similar patterns hold for
real capital stock and intermediate goods. These time trends are consistent with
the privatization of loss making state owned firms since 1998, which selects large
ones remain to be state owned. Yet, state owned firms are less productive than
private owned firms for each year, although their average labor productivity shows
a catching-up trend with non state owned firms during 1998-2007.
Although the CIES data surveys all state owned firms, it only includes non state
owned firms with at least 5 million yuan in sales. Compared to the aggregate in-
formation in Economic Census 2004 and 2008,3 firms in the CIES data are roughly
3Aggregate Economic Census information for 2004, 2008 and 2013 are available at National
Bureau of Statistics website http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/pcsj/. The 2004 census information
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Table 2.2: Summary Statistics of CIES Data 1998-2007, 1998 Constant Million
Yuan
Year Number NonSOE NonSOE NonSOE Employment GrossOutput WageBill Real Capital Intermediate Input Labor Productivity
% Emp. % Output % (Mean) (Mean) (Mean) (Mean) (Mean)
1998
-all 147,960 38% 32% 46% 308.47 39.45 2.46 26.39 30.77 0.0276
-SOE 91,560 - - - 337.40 34.21 2.39 27.62 26.44 0.0230
-nonSOE 56,400 - - - 274.14 47.94 2.57 24.40 37.80 0.0370
1999
-all 146,321 44% 39% 52% 321.31 43.18 2.56 26.96 33.32 0.0298
-SOE 82,274 - - - 349.23 37.06 2.51 29.09 28.32 0.0250
-nonSOE 64,047 - - - 304.39 51.04 2.63 24.22 39.75 0.0371
2000
-all 147,106 52% 47% 60% 309.60 50.62 2.79 27.16 38.13 0.0390
-SOE 70,192 - - - 343.53 42.32 2.79 29.02 31.43 0.0317
-nonSOE 76,914 - - - 297.02 58.19 2.79 25.48 44.25 0.0469
2001
-all 154,276 64% 58% 69% 283.05 53.91 2.87 26.16 40.96 0.0440
-SOE 55,658 - - - 325.73 47.01 3.21 30.01 35.12 0.0365
-nonSOE 98,618 - - - 275.22 57.81 2.67 23.99 44.24 0.0493
2002
-all 165,583 71% 65% 73% 276.28 59.06 2.98 25.60 45.14 0.0482
-SOE 48,155 - - - 334.66 55.67 3.37 31.96 41.84 0.0413
-nonSOE 117,428 - - - 268.52 60.46 2.82 23.00 46.50 0.0520
2003
-all 179,265 79% 73% 78% 269.48 70.24 3.14 25.46 52.45 0.0636
-SOE 37,829 - - - 349.39 72.39 4.07 37.03 53.75 0.0534
-nonSOE 141,436 - - - 260.08 69.67 2.89 22.37 52.10 0.0676
2004
-all 250,090 88% 83% 85% 224.07 66.02 2.88 21.04 48.44 0.0777
-SOE 30,490 - - - 309.48 77.41 4.33 36.08 56.93 0.0662
-nonSOE 219,600 - - - 214.39 64.43 2.67 18.96 47.26 0.0801
2005
-all 249,891 90% 85% 86% 235.58 80.35 3.33 24.23 56.96 0.0974
-SOE 25,008 - - - 351.88 105.76 5.47 47.82 76.72 0.0825
-nonSOE 224,883 - - - 227.28 77.53 3.09 21.63 54.76 0.1002
2006
-all 277,468 92% 88% 88% 227.03 89.73 3.62 24.99 62.63 0.1174
-SOE 21,226 - - - 358.41 131.84 6.66 56.43 95.23 0.1021
-nonSOE 256,242 - - - 220.14 86.25 3.37 22.41 59.93 0.1195
2007
-all 304,599 94% 90% 89% 221.25 101.71 4.07 26.14 70.98 0.1370
-SOE 17,215 - - - 403.50 183.73 8.78 72.44 134.74 0.1214
-nonSOE 287,384 - - - 213.30 96.79 3.79 23.37 67.16 0.1389
Labor productivity is defined as value added divided by employment.
Table 2.3: Aggregate Statistics of Above & Below 5 Million Sale Manufacturing
Firms
Number Gross Output Total Wage Employment
(billion) (billion) (10,000)
2004
Below 1,001,587 1,867.76 196.54 2,413.28
Above 256,999 17,528.35 791.97 5,667.34
% of above size firms 20.42% 90.37% 80.12% 70.13%
2008
Below 1,356,124 3,318.36 382.68 2,889.91
Above 396,950 44,135.83 2,678.62 7,731.57
% of above size firms 22.64% 93.01% 87.50% 72.79%
Current price. Source: The First and Second Economic Census (2004,2008), National Bureau of
Statistics
is also available at ChinaDataOnline. There are earlier censuses, such as Industrial Census (1995),
The First and Second Production Units Census (1996, 2001), that are either before 1998 when the
5 million cutoff is adopted, or are less aligned with the CIES in measurement.
Chapter 2. Intermediate Goods Misallocation in Chinese Firm-level Data 15
the top 20%manufacturing firms in sales according to Table 2.3.4 They hire around
70% of manufacturing workers, pay 80% of manufacturing wage bill and produce
more than 90% of manufacturing gross output. This difference between the CIES
data and the China’s manufacturing sector is important and will be revisited in
Chapter 3 and 4.
2.3 Misallocation of Intermediate Goods
This section presents evidence of intermediate goods misallocation using the CIES
data. First, intermediate goods cost accounts for roughly 70% of gross output rev-
enue in China, which is higher than the share of capital and labor combined. Sec-
ond, there is dispersion of marginal products of intermediate goods across firms
within 2-digit industries. Third, despite of a lowest dispersion in marginal prod-
ucts, eliminating intermediates misallocation gives the highest total gross output
and value added gains in the CIES.
2.3.1 Intermediate Goods Share
Intermediate goods have a high revenue share in production in China. At the ag-
gregate CIES data level, intermediate goods share is defined as the ratio of aggre-
gate intermediate goods to aggregate gross output.
Intermediate goods include goods, energy and services that are purchased out-
side of firms and used in production. While CIES data does not break up costs
on each component, materials are about 80% of intermediate input, according to
World Bank Data Survey (2012). Table 2.4 shows that the aggregate intermediate
goods is 74% of aggregate gross output in the CIES, with a similar share for state
owned and non state owned firms. The share of intermediate goods is concentrated
within 0.7-0.8 for most industries, while a few industries have a share close to 0.5
or 0.9 (see Figure 2.1). While a slightly lower intermediate goods share 68% is
reported in Jones (2011) using input-output information for the entire economy,5
China resembles South Korea and Japan in early 1970s and exceeds the average
intermediate goods share 50% among OECD countries (Jones, 2011).
4I abuse the language a little here since state-owned firms with sales below 5 million yuan are
also included in the CIES. This impact is, however, minor as state-owned shares are small in 2004.
5Input-output table for China can be downloaded from World Input-Output Database http://
www.wiod.org/new_site/database/niots.htm
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Table 2.4: Shares of Intermediate Goods in Gross Output, CIES
All Top 5 Industries State-Owned Non-State Owned
1998 78.01% 79.31% 77.29% 78.84%
1999 77.18% 78.33% 76.43% 77.88%
2000 75.34% 76.09% 74.27% 76.04%
2001 75.96% 76.71% 74.71% 76.53%
2002 76.43% 76.95% 75.15% 76.91%
2003 74.67% 75.51% 74.25% 74.78%
2004 73.38% 74.17% 73.55% 73.35%
2005 70.88% 70.64% 72.54% 70.63%
2006 69.79% 68.27% 72.23% 69.49%
2007 69.80% 68.95% 73.33% 69.39%
1998-2007 Average 74.14% 74.49% 74.38% 74.38%
Note the share of state-owned firms is declining over time. Top 5 industries are the industries
with top 5 highest total gross output in a given year.
Figure 2.1: Revenue Share of Intermediate Goods and Labor, 2-digit CIC Industry
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Labor share are defined as the ratio of total wage over total gross output in industry s.
2.3.2 Productivity Measure
A key variable for measuring misallocation is firm-level productivity. Productivity
for firm i in industry s, zis, is defined as follows:
zis = logyis − αsl loglis − αsmlogmis − αsklogkis (2.2)
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under the Cobb-Douglas production function assumption
yis = exp(zis)k
αk
is l
αl
ism
αm
is (2.3)
where yis and mis are real gross output and intermediate inputs. The capital mea-
sure kis at firm-level is the real capital stock constructed in Equation (2.1). I use
the wage bill to proxy labor inputs lis as in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) to control for
the human capital heterogeneity across different types of workers, which is evident
in the 2004 CIES data.6 In particular, 17.32% workers have some college degree in
an average CIES firm in 2004. There is a significant dispersion of this share across
firms. The 90-10 percentile difference is 43.62% and 5 times of the median fraction
8.31%.
I compute shares of labor αsl and intermediate goods αsm as the medians of firm-
level revenue shares within 2-digit CIC industries. While costs on intermediate
goods and labor are observable, costs on capital at firm-level is constructed by
0.85 − αsl − αsm. The return to scale parameter αsl + αsm + αsk = 0.85 is calibrated
from the later numerical exercise in Section 3.3.1 of Chapter 3. Alternatively, I
can impute αsk by imputing capital rental rate of 13% from World Bank Data Sur-
vey (2011). Section A.2 in appendix introduces the imputation method and corre-
sponding magnitudes of misallocation under this alternative αsk choice. Results are
similar to the magnitude of misallocation presented below.
2.3.3 Measuring Misallocation of Intermediate Goods
This subsection outlines some preliminary evidence of misallocation of intermedi-
ate goods in the CIES data. Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), misallocation in
intermediate goods is large, if its marginal products are dispersed such that reallo-
cating the intermediate goods across firms significantly increases aggregate gross
output.
The marginal products for any input x at firm i in industry s is given as:
MPix = αsx
yi
xi
, x ∈ {k, l,m} (2.4)
while the share of inputs αsk, αsl and αsm are the same as in Equation (2.2).
There are significant dispersions in the marginal products of all three inputs
62004 data has more information on education and qualifications of workers, which are absent
in regular years.
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in data. Figure 2.2 plots histograms of MPim,MPik and MPil across firms in the
pooled 1998-2007 data, trimmed by the top and bottom 1% of marginal products
for each input. Compared to capital and labor, marginal products of intermediate
goods show less dispersion. Similar patterns of distribution exist among non state
owned firms, which suggests that factors other than ownership drive dispersions
in marginal products.
Since industries differ in the types of intermediate goods and capital they use, I
examine misallocation across firms within 2-digit CIC industries. Within each in-
dustry, I first compute the coefficient of variation (CV) of marginal products for each
year. These industry-level CVs are averaged using industry level output weights
for a CV measure at an "average" industry level. These measures are then aver-
aged over years.7 Table 2.5 shows that the CV of MPim for an "average" industry
is 0.76, and smaller than those of capital, 12.45, and labor, 3.78. This is consis-
tent with Figure 2.2, suggesting that intra industry variations drive patterns of
marginal product distributions.
Another measure of misallocation is to compute gains from the reallocation of
inputs. To see which input is the most important in driving misallocation, I as-
sess gains by reallocating one input to equalize its marginal products across firms
within 2-digit industries, holding the other two inputs at the firm-level fixed. The
gross output gain for industry s is computed as:∑
i∈s exp(zi)(ki)α
s
k(li)α
s
l (m1i )
αsm −∑i∈s yi∑
i∈s yi
where m1i is the hypothetical intermediate goods input for firm i such that MP1im =
αsm
ys
m1i
= constant and ∑i∈sm1i = ∑i∈smi for industry s. Consequently, the value added
gain for industry s is: ∑
i∈s exp(zi)(ki)α
s
k(li)α
s
l (m1i )
αsm −∑i∈s yi
(1 − αsm)
∑
i∈s yi
I compute output-weighted average gross output and value added gains each
year and then average these gains over years.8 In Table 2.5, on average, a 2-digit
7In this exercise and the following reallocation exercise, I trim the productivity distribution every
year to be consistent with the model distribution in Chapter 3. Marginal products are not trimmed
here. The reason is that for the case of marginal products of intermediate goods, top 1% firms have
a smaller capital stock than all firms, suggesting that these firms could be financially constrained.
8The output weight is gross output for gross output gain, and value added for value added gain.
For this reason, output-weighted gains for an average industry equal aggregate gains.
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Figure 2.2: Marginal Products Histograms, 1998-2007 Pooled
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CIC industry increases its gross output by 35%, if marginal products of intermedi-
ate goods are equalized across firms. This implies an even larger value added gain,
135%, because of the 11−αsm multiplier. These gains are much larger than those for
capital and labor. In magnitude, a 135% value added gain from intermediate goods
is comparable to the value added gain in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) that reallocate
capital and labor after netting out intermediate goods from gross output.
Similar results hold in the private sector, suggesting that misallocation exists
intra ownership type, not only across ownership types. Specifically, reallocation
of intermediate goods alone across private owned firms within 2-digit industries
generates 32% of gross output gain, and 123% of value added gain. These gains
are again much larger than those for capital and labor.
Table 2.5: Dispersion in Marginal Products and Output Gains by Reallocating One
Input within CIC 2-digit Industries, Output Weighted, 1998-2007 Average
Intermediate Goods Capital Labor
All Firms
CV 0.76 12.45 3.78
Gross output gain 34.81% 5.66% 2.46%
Value added gain 135.01% 21.83% 9.49%
Private Owned Firms
CV 0.60 11.33 3.22
Gross output gain 31.55% 6.07% 2.43%
Value added gain 123.08% 23.86% 9.52%
This contrast between the output gain measure and the CV measure highlights
the importance of input shares in generating misallocation defined as in Hsieh
and Klenow (2009). Although dispersions of marginal products are indicative for
misallocation, inputs with low dispersions and high revenue shares may account
for more misallocation than inputs with high dispersions and low revenue shares.
Summary Intermediate goods are 74% of gross output revenue. This suggests that
if it is distorted andmisallocated across firms, the potential gross output and value
added gains are large. This section confirms this intuition. Although marginal
products of intermediates are less dispersed within 2-digit industries, the gross
output and value added gains from reallocating intermediates are 6 and 14 times
as large as that from capital and labor reallocation. This misallocation could not
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be accounted by the existence of state-owned firms, since a similar magnitude of
misallocation of intermediates is found across non state owned firms.
2.4 Impact on the Magnitude of Misallocation
If intermediate goods are misallocated as described in Section 2.3, a natural start-
ing point is to compute gross output misallocation, and then calculate total value
added gains. This section investigates the implication of intermediates misalloca-
tion on the magnitude of misallocation when one uses the value added approach in
the literature.
Under this value added approach, reallocation of capital and labor are based on
value added productivity zvais for firm i in industry s. This productivity is:
zvais = log(yis − mis) −
αsl
1 − αsm
loglis −
αsk
1 − αsm
logkis (2.5)
where factor shares αsk, αsl and αsm are the same as in Equation (2.2).
Based on zvais , value added gain for industry swhen reallocating capital and labor
is
∑
i∈s exp(zvais )(k
va
is )
αsk
1−αsm (lvais )
αsl
1−αsm −∑i∈s(yis − mis)∑
i∈s(yis − mis) (2.6)
where kvais and lvais are hypothetical capital and labor, such that their value added
marginal products, ( α
s
k
1−αsm )exp(z
va
is )(k
va
is )
αsk
1−αsm −1(lvais )
αsl
1−αsm and ( α
s
l
1−αsm )exp(z
va
is )(k
va
is )
αsk
1−αsm (lvais )
αsl
1−αsm −1,
are constant across firms within industry s.
However, the above value added approach ignores the potential misallocation of
intermediate goods. There are thus two problems in using value added approach
to quantify misallocation. First, value added productivity zvais may not reflect firms’
true productivities zis. If intermediate goods are efficiently allocated, zvais = 11−αsm zis.
This relation fails if intermediate goods allocation is distorted. In particular, if
distortion is positively correlated with productivity zis, value added productivity zvais
from Equation (2.5) would be lower (higher) than the value when distortions are
absent for a high (low) productivity zis firm. The opposite happens if this correlation
is negative (see Appendix Section A.3). This causes a bias on the magnitude of
misallocation in Equation (2.6) as capital and labor reallocated to high productivity
firms zis might be too few or too many, depending on how distortion correlates with
Chapter 2. Intermediate Goods Misallocation in Chinese Firm-level Data 22
productivity zis.
A second bias is due to the fact that Equation (2.6) does not capture the gains
from input complementarity. This means that if capital-labor are reallocated along
with intermediates, there would bemore output gain than the sum of gains from re-
allocating capital-labor and from reallocating intermediates. Table 2.6 illustrates
this point. During 1998-2007, the average gross output gain is 8.69%, if only cap-
ital and labor are reallocated to firms of the highest gross output productivities
within 2-digit industries. The sum of gross output gains from this exercise and
gains from reallocating intermediate goods alone is 43.5%, much smaller than the
138.72% gain when capital and labor are reallocated along with intermediates. In
other words, the input complementarity between intermediates and capital-labor
generates 94.51% total gross output gain in the CIES data.9
Table 2.6: Input Complementarity in Gross Output Misallocation, Industry Gross
Output Weighted
Year 1. Reallocate 2. Reallocate 3. Reallocate Complementary Misallocation
k, l m k, l,m =3-(1+2)
1998 8.09% 43.52% 162.75% 111.14%
1999 8.20% 34.91% 146.51% 103.41%
2000 8.00% 39.14% 151.40% 104.27%
2001 8.50% 31.58% 132.79% 92.71%
2002 8.62% 33.05% 134.34% 92.66%
2003 8.92% 27.92% 119.80% 82.96%
2004 9.23% 35.63% 143.44% 98.58%
2005 9.25% 34.49% 130.77% 87.03%
2006 8.98% 32.79% 129.71% 87.94%
2007 9.11% 35.09% 135.71% 91.51%
Average 8.69% 34.81% 138.72% 95.22%
Given the above arguments, I compute the value added gain as in Equation
2.6 in data, in comparison to value added gain when I reallocate capital, labor
and intermediate goods across firms within 2-digit industries. In the latter gross
9Table 2.6 also suggests some interesting time trends. During 1998-2007, capital and labor
misallocation increases over time while intermediate goods misallocation generally declines. The
overall gross output misallocation follows the trend of intermediate goods misallocation and also
declines.
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output approach, gross output gain is∑
i∈s exp(zis)(k
go
is )
αsk(lgois )
αsl (mgois )
αsm −∑i∈s yis∑
i∈s yis
(2.7)
and value added gain is 11−αsm times this gross output gain. k
go
is , l
go
is and m
go
is are hy-
pothetical capital, labor and intermediate goods such that MPik,MPil and MPim are
constant within industry s.
Table 2.7: Output Gains under Gross Output vs Value Added Approaches, Output
Weighted, 1998-2007 Average
Gross output approach Value added approach in literature
Gross output gain 138.01% -
Value added gain 550.74% 98.12%
Table 2.7 presents misallocation results under both value added and gross out-
put approaches. Similar to Hsieh and Klenow (2009), China’s total value added
in this data increases by almost 100%, if capital and labor are reallocated across
firms based on value added productivity. This number is yet much smaller than
the value added gain under gross output approach. If intermediate goods are real-
located along with capital and labor, gross output gains by 138% and value added
gains by 551%.10 This suggests that ignoring misallocation of intermediate goods
may significantly underestimate the true value added misallocation.
2.5 Intermediate Goods Frictions
Given the substantial misallocation of intermediate goods, this section explores
two potential frictions that could distort allocation of intermediate goods. In the
CIES, firms need time to order (pre-order) intermediate goods to produce and fi-
nally sell to buyers. The time period from buying intermediate goods to receiving
sales revenue could last 6 months. This suggests that intermediate goods may
need to be financed externally, giving rise to borrowing constraints on intermedi-
ate goods purchases.
10My number in gross output gain is close to the gross output gain in Bils, Klenow, and Ruane
(2017) in India’s data.
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2.5.1 Pre-Order for Intermediate Goods
One potential explanation for the dispersion in marginal products of intermediate
goods across firms is real frictions. If firms adjust intermediate goods in response
to productivity shocks in an undistorted competitive market, misallocation in inter-
mediate goods should not exist. In practice, production takes time from purchasing
intermediate goods to production, and from sales of output to collection of sales.
To examine the production process, I borrow the concept of operating cycle from
the trade credit and working capital management literature (e.g. Jose, Lancaster,
and Stevens, 1996; Petersen and Rajan, 1997). The operating cycle, OC, for firm i
is defined as:
OCi =
Inventoryi+Account Receivablesi
Salesi
∗ 365 (2.8)
where Inventoryi, Account Receivablesi and Salesi are the corresponding account-
ing entries in the CIES data. OC measures days between intermediate goods pur-
chases11 and collection of sales, standardized in 365 days.
The operating cycle can be further decomposed into two parts, from materials
to finished products and from sales of finished products to collection of sales. The
first part corresponds to a measure, Days in Inventory, DIi, defined as:
DIi =
Inventoryi
Salesi
∗ 365 (2.9)
and the second part corresponds to another measure, Days in Receivables, DRi,
defined as:
DRi =
Account Receivablesi
Salesi
∗ 365 (2.10)
In the CIES data, I calculate the mean and the median OC, DI and DR across
firms in each year, and average the means and medians over 1998-2007. Table 2.8
shows that there are an average of 160 days, and a median of 108 days between
intermediate goods purchases and collection of sales revenue. Days on inventory
are 87, and days on receivables 75, with each accounting for roughly half of the
operating cycle. Total operating cycle is longer for state owned firms, and similar
regardless of whether firms export or not (see Table 2.8). These evidences suggest
11Inventory includes materials, semi-finished products and finished products, with each takes up
about a third of inventory in the World Bank Enterprise Survey (2012).
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a pre-order real friction,12 as well as a working capital need on intermediate goods.
Table 2.8: Operating Cycles, Days in Inventory and Days in Receivables, CIES
1998-2007
All Ownership Exporter StatusPrivate State Foreign Exporter Non-exporter
OC
Mean 161 134 204 155 166 149
Median 108 97 130 120 108 107
DI
Mean 86 69 113 81 88 81
Median 47 41 57 54 45 51
DR
Mean 75 65 91 74 77 68
Median 43 39 49 51 43 43
The mean and median OC, DI and DR are calculated across firms for each group in each year, and
then average over 1998-2007.
2.5.2 Financial Frictions on Intermediate Goods
To finance purchases of intermediate goods and capital, firms may need to borrow.
If borrowing constraints on intermediate goods are important, one should expect
them to be binding for low net worth firms. In turn, this suggests that marginal
products of intermediate goods and capital among low net worth firms shall be
more dispersed than those among high net worth firms.
Using capital stock as a proxy for net worth, I compare CVs ofmarginal products
of intermediate goods and capital among firms with the top quartile capital stock
to those among firms with the bottom quartile of capital stock. Since more than
60% of 4-digit CIC industries have less than 200 firms, CVs are first calculated
at the 2-digit CIC industry level for each year. Mean CVs and confidence intervals
reported in Table 2.9 are then calculated when pooling CVs at 2-digit CIC industry
level over years. Firms in the bottom quartile of capital stock distribution have a
50% higher dispersion in the marginal product of intermediate goods, and 103%
higher in that of capital. The differences are statistically significant as the 95%
confidence intervals for the top subsample do not contain the average CVs in the
12A similar concept, time-to-ship, exist in international trade literature. See Leibovici andWaugh
(2016), Hummels and Schaur (2013)
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Table 2.9: CV of Marginal Products among Top and Bottom Quartile Firms in
Capital Stock
Intermediate Goods Capital
Top Bottom Top Bottom
Mean 0.25 0.37 0.98 1.99
95% C.I. [0.24, 0.26] [ 0.33, 0.41] [0.95,1.00] [0.91, 2.07]
Nobs 290 290
Each observation is industry-year level, with a industry defined at CIC 2-digit level. The top quar-
tile group is defined as top 25% firms in capital stock at this industry-year level, and the bottom
group as the bottom 25%.
bottom subsample, and vice versa.
Table 2.9 is consistent with a story that financial frictions not only hamper cap-
ital investment, but also distort intermediate goods choice at the firm-level. While
the former has been extensively studied in the literature, the latter motivates this
thesis to model financial frictions on intermediate goods in discussing misalloca-
tion in Chapter 3.
Summary This section suggests two specific distortions in intermediate goods.
First, firms order intermediate goods 87 days before production and 160 days before
realization of sales. Second, a smaller dispersion of its marginal products among
large firms has its consistency with borrowing constraints on intermediate goods.
2.6 Conclusion
While capital and labor misallocation have been extensively studied in the liter-
ature, the empirical facts about intermediate goods misallocation have not been
investigated. This is important since if intermediate goods are misallocated in the
data, the value added approach in quantifying misallocation misses the extra out-
put gains by reallocating intermediate goods. It would also invalidate the value
added approach since value added productivity is a biased measure of firm-level
productivity contaminated by intermediate goods distortions and frictions.
This chapter documents intermediate goods misallocation in the CIES data. I
explore (i) whether there exists misallocation of intermediate goods; (ii) bias on
the magnitude of value added output loss (i.e. Hsieh and Klenow, 2009) by ne-
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glecting intermediate goods misallocation; (iii) what frictions potentially account
for misallocated intermediate goods;
With a 74% gross output revenue share, reallocating intermediate goods alone
within 2-digit industries generates sizable gross output and value added gains.
These gains are about 6 and 14 times those from reallocating capital and labor,
respectively. Misallocation of intermediate goods implies that the value added ap-
proach in the literature may underestimate the magnitude of misallocation. Under
this approach, the total value added gain in the CIES is 98%, much smaller than
550% when all three inputs are reallocated simultaneously to firms with highest
gross output productivities.
I also find suggestive evidences of pre-order friction and borrowing constraints
on intermediates in the CIES data. The time period from ordering intermediates
to receiving sales revenue lasts about 6 months. This long operating cycle seems
to cause borrowing constraints on purchasing intermediate goods. Specifically, the
dispersion of marginal products of intermediates is higher among firms with low
net worth. A similar observation is found for the case of capital. Therefore, borrow-
ing constraints not only hamper capital investment, but also distort intermediate
goods choice at the firm-level.
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Chapter 3
Intermediate Goods Frictions and
Misallocation in China
3.1 Introduction
Substantial measured misallocation of inputs across firms has been documented in
China Industrial Enterprise Survey (CIES)(e.g. Hsieh and Klenow, 2009; Brandt,
Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang, 2012). According to Hsieh and Klenow (2009), output
could be doubled if marginal products of capital and labor were equalized across
firms. Several explanations of misallocation in a quantitative model have been
proposed, focusing on firm-level distortions on labor1 and capital, e.g. financial
frictions and adjustment costs. However, the substantial magnitude of misallo-
cation in the firm-level data found in Hsieh and Klenow (2009) remains largely
unexplained.2
The potential impact of intermediate goods frictions on misallocation has not
been investigated. Similar to capital, intermediate goods at the firm-level are sub-
ject to borrowing constraints in financing and real frictions in adjustment. Ac-
cording to Chapter 2 using the CIES data, intermediate goods need time to order,
and are purchased about half a year before receipt of sales from buyers. This also
creates a borrowing need for intermediate goods expenditure.
Howmuch can pre-order and borrowing constraints on intermediate goods quan-
1See, for example, Hopenhayn and Rogerson (1993), Da-Rocha, Tavares, and Restuccia (2015),
Mukoyama and Osotimehin (2016) for labor firing cost and misallocation.
2One strand of the literature models the distribution of firm-level productivity as a result of
costly experiments or human capital investment (e.g. Da-Rocha, Tavares, and Restuccia, 2016,
Gabler and Poschke, 2013 and Castro and Sevcik, 2016). The impact of distortions on misallocation
can be amplified through distorting allocations of inputs as well as the productivity improvement
process. However, the output loss implied in these studies deviates from the exercise in Hsieh and
Klenow (2009) that assumes a fixed productivity distribution for computing misallocation.
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titatively account for misallocation in China? To answer this question, I incorpo-
rate these two frictions on intermediate goods, as well as borrowing constraints on
capital, into a standard firm investment model of Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006).
Similar to their model, firms in this chapter maximize the discounted net present
value of future dividends, facing an idiosyncratic AR(1) productivity process and
capital adjustment costs.
Unlike the standard heterogeneous firm investment model, this paper models
intermediate goods frictions as well as borrowing constraints on capital. Specifi-
cally, firms order and prepay for a fraction of intermediate goods one period ahead
(pre-order). Firms also face fixed and convex adjustment costs when choosing their
capital for next period. Payments of intermediate goods and capital investment are
financed by retained earnings, and borrowings if necessary. Firm-level borrowing
is subject to a constraint that endogenously depends on firms’ default risk and net
worth. When stochastic productivities are realized at the beginning of a period,
firms choose to continue or exit under limited liability. If continue, they choose op-
timal labor, and intermediate good usage that cannot exceed the pre-ordered level.
In other words, the intermediate goods adjustment cost is infinitely large when
firms scale it up and zero when they scale it down.
To quantify how much the model can account for measured misallocation in
data, I calibrate the model to match key moments in firm-level debt and produc-
tivity, as well as the market share distribution over firm age groups in the CIES
data over 1998-2007. The calibration takes into account the fact that the CIES
has a threshold sales of 5 million yuan, and only includes top 20% manufacturing
firms in the sales distribution.3 The purpose is to reasonably capture the fact that
a large fraction of firms take years to accumulate capital before they grow above
the threshold sales.
Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009), the measure of misallocation is defined
as gross output gain if marginal products of intermediate goods, capital and la-
bor were all equalized across firms. I find that the model generates substantial
misallocation and accounts for 69% of measured misallocation in the CIES data.
Specifically, gross output gain is 96% of the actual output in the simulated data,
and averages 140% in the CIES data over 1998-2007. In other words, gross out-
put could be nearly doubled in the model, and more than doubled in the CIES, if
3To be more specific, the CIES data has a 5 million yuan sales threshold for private-owned firms
to be included. Such a threshold gives approximately the top 20% firms in sales according to the
aggregate statistics in 2004. Further details would be discussed in Section 3.3.1.
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marginal products of intermediate goods, capital and labor were equalized across
firms.
There are four frictions that cause misallocation in the benchmark model: bor-
rowing constraints and pre-order on intermediate goods, and borrowing constraints
and adjustment costs on capital. To decompose the contribution of each friction to
misallocation, I eliminate frictions one by one from the benchmark model. My first
counterfactual experiment removes borrowing constraints on intermediate goods.
The resulting potential output gain in this counterfactual specification is 64%. This
suggests that borrowing constraints on intermediate goods induce 33% (32/96) of
misallocation in the benchmark model, and accounts for 23% (32/140) of misalloca-
tion in the CIES data. Second, I further remove pre-order on intermediate goods by
allowing firms to choose the static optimal amount of intermediate goods after their
productivity shocks. This experiment lowers the misallocation to a 49% potential
gross output gain. Therefore, pre-order on intermediate goods accounts for 16%
(15/96) of misallocation in the model and 11% (15/140) of that in the CIES data.
The two frictions on intermediate goods together generate 49% of misallocation in
the benchmark model, and 34% of that in the CIES data.
I find that further eliminating borrowing constraints has a small impact onmis-
allocation. The potential gross output gain in this counterfactual specification is
48%, only 1% lower than that in the second. This implies that while capital adjust-
ment costs account for 50% (48/96) and 35% (48/140) of misallocation in the model
and in the CIES data, borrowing constraints on capital induce a small amount
of misallocation. This result is consistent with Midrigan and Xu (2014) and Moll
(2014), and is a consequence of persistent productivities and firms’ ability to save
such that top productive firms own a large share of capital regardless of the con-
straint.
The intuition for why intermediate goods frictions have a large impact on mis-
allocation is due to its high revenue share in production, and the recurrent need
to finance because of one-period depreciation. For illustration, set the reference
model as the one with adjustment costs and borrowing constraints on capital only
in which firms choose the static optimal amount of intermediate goods. At time t,
pre-order and down-payment for intermediate goods increase the borrowing need
for firms, on top of capital investment. Capital investment is therefore crowded
out, which lowers profit and net worth at time t+1. Additionally, at time t+1, firms
cannot buy more intermediate goods intra period after high productivity shocks
because of pre-order. The consequent profit is lower. The lower current net worth
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at t + 1 caused by the above two effects further lowers capital investment and more
importantly, intermediate goods for time t + 2, and so forth. This low net worth
effect is long lasting since financing intermediate goods is recurrent by one-period
depreciation and puts much more stress on borrowing constraints. Consequently,
capital accumulation is slowed and the stationary distribution features firms with
lower capital stocks.4
The impact of intermediate goods frictions on measured misallocation is of gen-
eral interests and not specific to China. Jones (2011) documents that intermediate
goods revenue share is around 50% in most countries, while the working capital
management literature about other countries (e.g. Jose, Lancaster, and Stevens,
1996) document a similar time length between intermediate goods purchases and
collection of sales. Further, financial markets are underdeveloped in most develop-
ing countries, for instance, India and Mexico (e.g. Ghate and Kletzer, 2012; Pratap
and Urrutia, 2012), and even in modern developed countries in a certain historical
stage.5
This chapter is related to a growing literature on misallocation.6 Several pa-
pers have studied productivity and misallocation in China. Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) first document large firm-level distortions and substantial misallocation in
manufacturing firm-level data. Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012) fur-
ther document limited input reallocation across firms in China despite a high TFP
growth over 1998-2007. Several explanations have been proposed in the literature:
capital misallocation caused by preferred lending to state-owned firms (Brandt,
Tombe, and Zhu, 2013), trade and migration costs (Tombe and Zhu, 2015), entry
costs (Brandt, Kambourov, and Storesletten, 2016), and financial frictions (Bai,
Lu, and Tian, 2016). Unlike these studies, this paper focuses on the novel inter-
mediate goods frictions and provides a quantitative model to assess their roles in
accounting for misallocation.
This chapter is also related towork on capitalmisallocation across firms. Bartles-
man, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2013) argue a dynamic capital investmentmodel
with other firm-level distortions important in accounting for cross-country differ-
4The crowding-out effect of working capital on capital investment is consistent with Fazzari and
Petersen (1993). They find that working capital at the firm-level has a negative impact on fixed
capital investment for financially constrained U.S. firms with zero dividend payments during 1970-
1979.
5See, for instance, Ziebarth (2013) that finds a comparable amount of misallocation in the 19th
century U.S. manufacturing sector as in modern China and India.
6See three recent surveys, Restuccia and Rogerson (2013), Hopenhayn (2014) and Buera, Ka-
boski, and Shin (2015), for a comprehensive review of the literature.
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ences in size-productivity covariances. Asker, Collard-Wexler, andDeLoecker (2014)
find that stochastic productivities combined with capital adjustment costs are im-
portant in accounting for dispersions in marginal products of capital. A number
of papers study financial frictions and capital misallocation. The argument is that
firms of low net worth are financially constrained, and cannot consequently choose
inputs in response to productivities. However, a counter-argument lies in the dy-
namic process that firms self-finance and grow out of constraints, which results in
a small misallocation in the steady state. This self-financing does not undo mis-
allocation if (1) productivity is less persistent (see Caselli and Gennaioli, 2013;
Moll, 2014); (2) firms cannot save (see Amaral and Quintin, 2010); (3) transition
dynamics start from a pre-misallocated economy (see Buera and Shin, 2013); (4) en-
trepreneurs slowly accumulate wealth before paying entry costs (see Midrigan and
Xu, 2014); and (5) the borrowing constraint is endogenous (see Bai, Lu, and Tian,
2016). This paper combines the real frictions and financial frictions of capital, and
extend them to the discussion of intermediate goods. The key of misallocation in
the stationary distribution in this paper comes from the recurrent financing need
of intermediate goods that slows down firms’ capital accumulation.
Lastly, this chapter is related to the work linking intermediate goods with TFP.
Jones (2011) and Bartelme and Gorodnichenko (2015) argue that vertical linkages
of industries through intermediate goods can amplify distortions in resource allo-
cation and explain cross-country TFP differences. Mendoza and Yue (2012) and
Pratap and Urrutia (2012) find working capital constraints on intermediate goods
in emerging markets important in explaining TFP drops post financial crisis. This
paper differentiates from these studies in arguing the role of intermediate goods
frictions in slowing capital accumulation and causing misallocation.
The rest of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the model.
Section 3 calibrates the model, computes the misallocation in the model and in the
data, and implements decomposition exercises of misallocation contributed by each
friction. Section 4 concludes.
3.2 Model
To quantify how borrowing constraints and pre-order on intermediate goods gen-
erate misallocation, this paper incorporates these frictions into a standard firm
investment model of Cooper and Haltiwanger (2006). Two types of agents live in
the model: firms and financial intermediaries. Firms organize production and
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maximize net present value of dividends, given financial and real frictions on both
intermediate goods and capital. Firms endogenously exit when the net present
value of dividends is smaller than exiting and liquidating its assets. Under limited
liability, default happens when the liquidation value cannot cover debt repayment.
Financial intermediaries consequently choose a break-even interest rate that re-
flects this default probability. The equilibrium in loanable funds market leads to
an endogenous borrowing constraint that shapes firm dynamics.
3.2.1 Firms
The infinite horizon economy is populated with a mass Mt of heterogeneous firms
at time t that grows over time. A firm is a decreasing-return-to-scale technology
that produces gross output with inputs of intermediate goods, capital and labor,
given an exogenous and stochastic productivity. Firms maximize their present val-
ues of future dividends and live forever until they exit. After entry, firms cannot
issue new equity and only access to one-period borrowings and savings at financial
intermediaries. When exit, firms pay debt up to its liquidated assets under the
limited liability.
Production Function Firms produce in a gross output production:
yt = exp(zt)k
αk
t l
αl
t m
αm
t (3.1)
where yt is gross output, zt is productivity, and kt, lt, and mt are capital, labor and
intermediate goods with their respective revenue shares αk, αl, and αm. The pro-
duction technology is assumed to satisfy decreasing return to scale, αk +αl +αm < 1
.
Firm-level productivity zt is stochastic and evolves according to an AR(1) pro-
cess:
zt+1 = (1 − ρ)µz + ρzt + t+1 (3.2)
where µz is its unconditional mean and common across firms, ρ describes the per-
sistence of productivity, and t+1 is the shock term that follows N(0, σ2 ). The conse-
quent unconditional distribution for productivity zt is N(µz, σ2z ), where σz = σ√1−ρ2 .
Given productivity zt, capital kt and intermediate goods mt, firms choose labor
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input lt to maximize its gross output net of labor payment, pit:
pit = max
lt
pyyt(zt, kt,mt, lt) − wlt (3.3)
where py is output price and w is wage. The separability of labor inputs from other
choices as above is because labor inputs can be adjusted intra period without any
frictions.
Since this paper considers firms in a partial equilibrium framework, output de-
mand and input supplies are not modeled here. Consequently, I assume constant
exogenous prices of output py and wage w, and set them to 1. Similar for interme-
diate goods price pm in the later subsection.
Pre-Order for Intermediate Goods Firms order intermediate goods mt+1 one
period in advance (pre-order), when choosing next period capital kt+1. Formt+1 inter-
mediate goods, firms pay ω fraction, ωmt+1 at time t, and the remaining (1 − ω)mt+1
at time t + 1.
In this environment, firms need working capital to pay for intermediate goods
before sales revenue is collected. If the realization of next period productivity zt+1
is relatively low, the pre-ordered level mt+1 could be too high. In this case, firms
can choose m¯t+1 < mt+1 to maximize profit at time t + 1 by selling off the extra inter-
mediate good mt+1 − m¯t+1. However, if the pre-ordered intermediate goods level mt+1
is too low to be optimal in a high productivity realization zt+1, firms cannot adjust
the intermediates goods beyond mt+1. In other words, firms choose m¯t+1 ≤ mt+1 to
maximize the profit Πt+1 after payment for intermediate goods:
Πt+1 = max
m¯t+1≤mt+1
pit+1(zt+1, kt+1, m¯t+1) − (1 − ω)mt+1 + (mt+1 − m¯t+1) (3.4)
Capital Adjustment Costs Firms can adjust capital stock using two technolo-
gies that involve different adjustment costs: a maintenance type mt that can be
used for small changes in capital stock, and a construction type ct that allows large
investment/divestment.
In particular, while next period capital kt+1 can be any value in the construc-
tion type ct, in the maintenance type mt, next period capital kt+1 is restricted to
a small range around the depreciated current capital stock (1 − δ)kt, i.e. kt+1 ∈
[(1 − δ − ζ)kt, (1 − δ + ζ)kt]. There is no fixed cost ξkt with the maintenance type
Chapter 3. Intermediate Goods Frictions and Misallocation in China 37
mt, while a convex cost with parameter θ exists in both two types. Thus, the cost
structure C(kt, kt+1|x) under type x ∈ {ct,mt} is
C(kt, kt+1|x) =
 ξkt + θ((1−δ)kt−kt+1)
2
2(1−δ)kt if kt+1 < [(1 − δ − ζ)kt, (1 − δ + ζ)kt], x = ct
θ((1−δ)kt−kt+1)2
2(1−δ)kt if kt+1 ∈ [(1 − δ − ζ)kt, (1 − δ + ζ)kt], x = mt
(3.5)
Note that there is no cost when firms choose to let capital depreciates and do noth-
ing, i.e. kt+1 = (1 − δ)kt.
This capital adjustment cost structure in (3.5) is similar to that in Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006) with an addition of the fixed cost free investment range [(1 −
δ − ζ)kt, (1 − δ + ζ)kt].
Borrowing Constraints Firms can save or borrow at financial intermediaries.
To save, they purchase bonds issued by financial intermediaries with a competitive
price q1t+1 at time t and get paid back $1 at time t + 1. The saving interest rate is
thus r1 = 1q1t+1 − 1.
When firms borrow, they issue one-period corporate bonds. As detailed later in
the section on financial intermediaries, the price of corporate bonds, q2t+1(zt, bt+1, kt+1,mt+1),
depends on firms’ fundamentals: current productivity zt, future debt bt+1, future
capital stock kt+1 and future intermediate goods mt+1. The price of bonds q2t+1 de-
creases with the expected default probability, implying a higher interest rate for
borrowing. In the extreme case with no default probability, debt price q2t+1 = 11+r2
where r2 is called the prime borrowing interest rate.
The prime borrowing interest rate r2 is greater than the saving interest rate
r1 by assuming intermediation costs for financial intermediaries. With the spread
r2− r1, firms never find it optimal to have savings and borrowings at the same time.
Therefore, I collapse borrowings and savings into one variable bt+1. When bt+1 > 0,
firms borrow at the price qt+1 = q2t+1. When bt+1 < 0, firms save at the price qt+1 = q1t+1.
Since firms cannot issue new equity, dividend by the end of each period dt shall
be nonnegative after payments for next period intermediate goods ωmt+1,capital
investment kt+1−(1−δ)kt+C(kt, kt+1|x), repayment of debt or saving bt, new borrowings
or savings qt+1(zt, bt+1, kt+1,mt+1)bt+1 and operation cost co:
dt = Πt(zt, kt,mt) + (1 − δ)kt − ωmt+1 − kt+1 −C(kt, kt+1|x) − bt + qt+1(zt, bt+1, kt+1,mt+1)bt+1 − co ≥ 0
(3.6)
The above constraint is endogenous, since the price of corporate bonds depends
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on how much firms borrow.
Value of Continuation At the beginning of each period, firms choose to con-
tinue operation or exit. If a firm continues, given state variables (z, b, k,m) and
the bond price schedules q′(z, b′, k′,m′), firms’ problem is to maximize its value of
continuation
Vc(z, b, k,m) = max
b′,k′,m′,x∈{ct,mt}
Π(z, k,m) + (1 − δ)k − ωm′ − k′ −C(k, k′|x) − b + q′(z, b′, k′,m′)b′
− co + βEz′ |zV(z′, b′, k′,m′) (3.7)
s.t. Π(z, k,m) + (1 − δ)k − ωm′ − k′ −C(k, k′|x) − b + q′(z, b′, k′,m′)b′ − co ≥ 0
b′ ≤ b¯ (No-Ponzi Game)
where β is the discounting factor, and b¯ is a debt limit to prevent firms from playing
Ponzi Games. Note that β cannot be greater than 11+r2 , because otherwise firms bor-
row indefinitely and store the cash. If β < 11+r2 , firms only borrow when investment
on capital and intermediate goods has a return greater than 1
β
− 1. To make sure
that firms borrow whenever the return is greater than the prime borrowing rate, I
set β = 11+r2 .
Solutions to problem (3.7) are policy functions
Demand of debt/saving: b′d = b′d(z, b, k,m; q′) (3.8)
Next period capital: k′ = k′(z, b, k,m; q′) (3.9)
Next intermediate goods: m′ = m′(z, b, k,m; q′) (3.10)
The indicator function T(z, b, k,m; b′, k′,m′) describes the transition of current state
(z, b, k,m) to the choice partition of future state (b′, k′,m′) and is defined as:
T(z, b, k,m; b′, k′,m′) =
 1 if (3.8), (3.9), and (3.10) hold for firm (z, b, k,m)0 otherwise (3.11)
Exit andDefault The value of exit is straightforward. At the end of production
in the current period, net worth of a firm equals cash Π(z, k,m) − b1(b ≤ 0) plus
depreciated capital (1−δ)kminus debt b1(b > 0). Once a firm decides to exit, (1−γ2)
fraction of cash Π(z, k,m)−b1(b < 0), and (1−γ1) fraction of capital (1−δ)k evaporates,
γ2 < γ1. In other words, exit is costly and consumes some resources. Under limited
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liability, value of exiting V x(z, b, k,m) for the firm
V x(z, b, k,m) = max{γ2Π(z, k,m) − b[1(b ≤ 0)γ2 + 1(b > 0)] + γ1(1 − δ)k, 0} (3.12)
An endogenous exit decision χ(z, b, k,m) is made by comparing the continuation
value Vc and the exiting value V x:
χ(z, b, k,m) = 1{V x(z, b, k,m) > Vc(z, b, k,m)} (3.13)
Therefore, the value function V(z, b, k,m) before the exit decision is made is:
V(z, b, k,m) = max{V x(z, b, k,m),Vc(z, b, k,m)} (3.14)
Default on debt repayment only happens when firms exit, while debts are rolled
over when firms choose to continue.7 However, firms may exit without default.
First, if firms save b ≤ 0, there is no meaningful default discussion. Second, if the
liquidation value of capital and cash γ2Π(z, k,m) + γ1(1 − δ)k is greater than debt
repayment b, firms repay all.
Thus, the only case when an exiting firm defaults is that it borrows and the
liquidation value of asset is smaller than the debt. Loss for lenders in this case is:
b − γ2Π(z, k,m) − γ1(1 − δ)k (3.15)
3.2.2 Entrants and Firm Size Distribution
In each time period t, there are a mass of µentMt entrants. Each entrant draws
an initial productivity z0 and an initial wealth b0 < 0 independently. Entrants
do not differ from incumbents in the unconditional productivity distribution, i.e.
z0 ∼ N(µz, σ2z ). The initial wealth b0 < 0 is from a Pareto distribution with a density
function g(−b0):
g(−b0) =

αaαmin
(−b0)α+1 i f − b0 ≥ amin,
0 i f − b0 < amin.
(3.16)
where amin is the minimum wealth. Note that firms have zero initial capital stock
and intermediate goods, i.e. k0 = 0,m0 = 0.
By the above assumptions, firms do not enter and produce right away. There
7See, for instance, Bai, Lu, and Tian (2016) for default when firms continue.
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exists a preparation period for entrants to build up capital stock and intermediate
goods out of scratch, according to their initial productivity z0 and wealth b0. Since
k0 = 0, entrants do not pay capital adjustment costs. Their choices of debt/saving
b′ent(z0,−b0, 0, 0), capital k′ent(z0,−b0, 0, 0), and intermediate goods m′ent(z0,−b0, 0, 0) are
given by maximizing the value function of entrants Vent(z0, b0, 0, 0): 8
Vent(z0, b0, 0, 0) = max
b′,k′,m′
−ωm′ − k′ − b0 + q′(z, b′, k′,m′)b′
− co + βEz′ |z0V(z′, b′, k′,m′) (3.17)
s.t. − ωm′ − k′ − b0 + q′(z, b′, k′,m′)b′ − co ≥ 0 (3.18)
b′ ≤ b¯ (No-Ponzi Game)
where the next period z′ evolves in the same AR(1) process as for incumbents in
Equation (3.2), and V is the value function of incumbents in Equation (3.14). This
implies that from t + 1 on, the mass of µentMt entrants start production and behave
the same as incumbents.
As before, the indicator functionTent(z, b, 0, 0; b′, k′,m′) = 1 if policy functions with
state (z, b, 0, 0) give next period choices b′, k′,m′, and 0 otherwise. Note that an initial
misallocation on entrants arises due to the constraint of (3.18). A high productivity
entrant with a low draw of wealth finds quite hard to finance the first period capital
stock and intermediate goods without retained earnings from the past.
3.2.3 Financial Intermediaries
There exists a continuum of risk-neutral competitive intermediaries that take de-
posits and lend.9 For every dollar of intermediation, the cost includes a deposit
interest rate r1 and an intermediate cost cI.
Given a debt price function q′(z, b′, k′,m′), the problem for a competitive lender
8Unlike most literature in entry, exit and industrial dynamics, e.g. Hopenhayn (1992), Cooley
and Quadrini (2001), Bento and Restuccia (2015), this paper does not model endogenous entry. In
general equilibrium, an endogenous entrymeans that there is an equilibriummass of entrants, such
that the value of entry equates entry costs for the marginal entrants. If there are more entrants
than the equilibrium, value of entry is too low because output price is lower, and input prices are
higher than those in equilibrium, and vice versa. Since this paper adopts a partial equilibrium
framework, there are no price channels to shape the endogenous entry. The approach here is rather
to take some equilibrium mass of entrants, as well as their distribution of productivity and wealth
as given.
9 In this paper, intermediaries are not restricted to financial institutions. One can view the
competitive lender as a representation that includes intermediate goods suppliers and other lenders
as well. What is implicitly assumed is that the competitive lender can see all borrowing, including
trade credit in the form of account payables for example.
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is to choose a supply function b′s = b′s(z, k′,m′; q′) to maximize its expected profit:
max
b′
(1 − Ez′ |zχ′(z′, b′, k′,m′))b′ + Ez′ |z{χ′(z′, b′, k′,m′)(b′ − γ2Π(z′, k′,m′) (3.19)
− γ1(1 − δ)k′)} − (1 + r1 + cI)q′b′
The first term here presents debt repayment b′s with the probability that firms
continue and debt is rolled over 1 − Ez′ |zχ′(z′, b′s, k′,m′). The second term gives an
expected loss when the firm defaults when productivity is below some threshold.
3.2.4 Equilibrium
A recursive equilibrium is a debt price function q′(z, b′, k′,m′), policy functions of
incumbent firms b′d(z, b, k,m; q′), k′(z, b, k,m; q′) and m′(z, b, k,m; q′), a transition in-
dicator function for incumbents T(z, b, k,m; b′, k′,m′), policy functions of entrants
b′ent(z0,−b0, 0, 0; q′), k′ent(z0,−b0, 0, 0; q′) and m′ent(z0,−b0, 0, 0; q′), an exit rule χ(z, b, k,m),
a transition indicator function for entrants Tent(z, b, 0, 0; b′, k′,m′), a supply function
of funds bs(z, k′,m′; q′), a debt price function q(z, b′, k′,m′), an endogenous mass of
firms M′ and a distribution of firms f ′(z′, b′, k′,m′) such that
1. given the debt price function q′(z, b′, k′,m′), policy functions of b′d(z, b, k,m; q′),
k′(z, b, k,m; q′) and m′(z, b, k,m; q′) solve the problem of firms in (3.7), and the
exit rule χ(z, b, k,m) solves the exiting problem (3.13).
2. given the debt price function q′(z, b′, k′,m′), the supply function of funds bs(z, k′,m′; q′)
solves lenders’ problem (3.19).
3. the debt price function q′(z, b′, k′,m′) clears supply and demand of funds at the
firm-level, if b′ > 0:
T(z, b, k,m; b′, k′,m′)b′d(z, b, k,m; q′) = b′s(z, k′,m′; q′) for incumbents (3.20)
and
Tent(z, b0, 0, 0; b′, k′,m′)b′dent(z, b, 0, 0; q
′) = b′s(z, k′,m′; q′) for entrants (3.21)
with a special case q′(z, b′, k′,m′) = 11+r1+cI when there is zero expected default
probability. The consequent interest rate r2 = r1 + cI is the prime borrowing
interest rate previously named.
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4. the distribution and mass of firms f ′ and M′ evolve recursively as in (3.22)
and (3.23), respectively, given an initial mass M0, an initial firm distribution
f0, mass of entrants µent, an exit rule χ(z, b, k,m) and policy functions of incum-
bents and entrants:
f ′(z′, b′, k′,m′) = χ′(z′, b′, k′,m′){
∫
z
∫
b
∫
k
∫
m
f (z, b, k,m)T(z, b, k,m; b′, k′,m′)pi(z′|z)dzdbdkdm
+ µent
∫
z
∫
b
φ(z)g(−b)Tent(z, b, 0, 0; b′, k′,m′)dzdb} (3.22)
M′ = M(1 −
∫
z′
∫
b′
∫
k′
∫
m′
χ(z′, b′, k′,m′) f (z′, b′, k′,m′)dz′db′dk′dm′ + µent) (3.23)
with a growth rate µent −
∫
z′
∫
b′
∫
k′
∫
m′ χ(z
′, b′, k′,m′) f (z′, b′, k′,m′)dz′db′dk′dm′. A
stationary distribution is defined as f ′(z, b, k,m) = f (z, b, k,m) for any state
(z, b, k,m).
3.3 Quantitative Analysis
This section discusses how I map the model in Section 3.2 into the CIES data in
order to quantify the role of intermediate goods frictions in shaping misallocation.
I calibrate the model to the CIES data and compare the measured misallocation
generated in the model to that in the CIES data. Several counterfactual experi-
ments are then implemented to quantitatively assess misallocation generated by
each friction.
To implement the calibration and counterfactual experiments, simulated data
are sampled from the model implied stationary distribution. Despite not capturing
the non-stationary part of China’s growth,10 the goal is to understand how inter-
mediate goods frictions affect firm-level investment and production decisions in a
stationary distribution approach.
My calibration strategy takes into account the threshold sales of 5 million yuan
in the CIES data. Section 3.3.1 elaborates entry and exit patterns in the CIES data,
10Unlike developed countries, China’s market based economy starts since 1980s and is hard to be
described as an economy in its steady state or on some balanced growth path. For countries that
experience reforms, Jeong and Townsend (2007) and Buera and Shin (2013) provide a framework of
transitional dynamics analysis to understand how reforms gradually change resource misallocation
over time.
Chapter 3. Intermediate Goods Frictions and Misallocation in China 43
and the necessity of modeling the threshold sales. The model is then parametrized
and calibrated to replicate key moments in firm-level debt, productivity, as well as
the market share distribution in the CIES data. Out of model fit suggests similar
firm dynamics in the model and in the CIES data for a given cohort.
Section 3.3.2 compares themeasuredmisallocation in themodel and in the data,
using Hsieh and Klenow (2009)’s definition. If marginal products of intermediate
goods, capital and labor were equalized, gross output could be increased by 96% in
the model and 140% on average in the CIES data over 1998-2007. In other words,
the model accounts for 69% of measured misallocation in the CIES data. Section
3.3.3 decomposes the misallocation generated by the model into contributions by
borrowing constraints and real frictions on intermediate goods and capital. I find
that intermediate goods frictions account for about a half and 34% of the misallo-
cation in the model and in the CIES data, respectively. Borrowing constraint on
intermediate goods is quantitatively more important than pre-order, and accounts
for a third and 23% of the misallocation in the model and in the CIES data. While
borrowing constraints on capital generates small misallocation, capital adjustment
costs account for the other half of misallocation in the model, and 35% in the CIES
data. With intermediate goods frictions, the capital accumulation is much slower
than without. This leads to a larger amount of misallocation that is hard to get
with only frictions on capital.
3.3.1 Parametrization
The CIES data includes only the top 20% firms in the manufacturing sector be-
cause of the minimum sales of 5 million yuan threshold (see Table 2.3 in Chapter
2). This impacts the mapping between model and data in firm dynamics and mea-
sured misallocation. A significant fraction of entrants and exiters in the CIES are
incumbent firms crossing the 5 million threshold sales. If the CIES was taken
as the manufacturing sector, several model parameters, e.g. standard deviation
of firm-level productivities, would be misspecified. Therefore, I first outline how I
take into account the threshold sales before discussion on model parametrization.
For more data details, see Section 2.2 in Chapter 2.
Entry and Exit in the CIES Because of the 5 million threshold sales, I name
entrants in the CIES data as data entrants to distinguish from new firms in the
manufacturing sector. Similarly, data exiters refer to firms that disappear from the
CIES data. To evaluate the potential impact of the threshold sales on the model
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calibration, I compare the fraction and market share of these firms in the CIES to
that in the U.S. manufacturing sector (Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1988).
Since the U.S. literature uses census data that are 5-year apart, I study entry
and exit in the CIES over a 5-year horizon. With the birth year information, I clas-
sify data entrants into two groups depending on whether these firms are younger
or older than 5 years old. I name firms who are more than 5 years old as old data
entrants, and those less as young data entrants.
Table 3.1 presents fractions, market shares and relative sizes of data entrants
over 1998-2003 and over 2002-2007.
Table 3.1: CIES Data Entrants over a 5-Year Horizon
1998-2003 2002-2007
Number of Firms
Incumbents 32.11% 24.37%
Data Entrants (Age > 5) 29.06% 30.47%
Data Entrants (Age ≤5) 38.83% 45.16%
Total Market Share
Incumbents 50.86% 44.42%
Data Entrants (Age > 5) 22.45% 24.85%
Data Entrants (Age ≤5) 26.69% 30.73%
Relative Size of Output
Data Entrants (Age > 5) 0.49 0.45
Data Entrants (Age ≤ 5) 0.43 0.37
Incumbents are defined as firms who are in CIES data for both year t and t + 5. Data entrants are
defined as firms that are not in the CIES data at t, but appear in the data at t + 5. Age is computed
as observation year t + 5 minus the birth year.
Data entrants over a 5-year horizon are the majority of firms in the CIES data.
Between 1998 to 2003, 66% of firms in 2003 enter into the dataset after 1998,
among which 43% are old data entrants more than 5 years old. The fraction of data
entrants increases during 2002-2007, with a similar fraction of old data entrants.
In terms of market share, data entrants in 2003 and 2007 produce 49% and 56% of
gross output in the economy. This suggest that a CIES data entrant produces, on
average, 37% to 49% of the average gross output level of CIES incumbents in 2003
and 2007.
Compared to their U.S. counterparts, the fraction and the average size of data
entrants are much larger in the CIES. According to Dunne, Roberts, and Samuel-
son (1988), entrants over a 5-year horizon are 52% of U.S. census firms, producing
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Figure 3.1: Age Distribution of Data Entrants in 2003
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Data entrants are defined as firms are not in the CIES data in 1998, but appear in the data in 2003,
same to the definition in Table 3.1.
a market share of 17%. This suggests that an average data entrant is at least two
times large as its counterpart in the U.S. census data.11
The threshold sales mean that a large fraction of new firms in the manufac-
turing sector are unobserved. Over time, some of these firms exit, while others
accumulate capital, net worth and grow in sales. The age distribution of data en-
trants over 1998-2003 in Figure 3.1 suggests that about 30% of these firms take 5
to 15 years to grow above 5 million yuan. This implies that either the threshold
sales is too high in the sales distribution, or the growth of firms is too slow. The
steepness of this CDF provides an identification to gauge the role of frictions on in-
termediate goods and capital in slowing down firms growth. Logically, if frictions
are small, productive firms grow rapidly and quickly surpass the threshold sales.
The resulting age distribution among data entrants in Figure 3.1 should have a
large density on ages smaller than 5, and the CDF should be steep. The degree of
age dependence in entering the CIES in Figure 3.1 reveals information on frictions
of intermediate goods and capital. 12
The interpretation of exit from the CIES data is complicated by the fact that
11According to Hsieh and Klenow (2014), average employment among 5- to 9- year-old firms is
twice as that of firms who age from 1 to 5.
12The idea of age and size dependence has been studied in Davis, Haltiwanger, and Schuh (1996)
and Cooley and Quadrini (2001) with the latter using financial frictions as an explanation.
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one cannot distinguish between firms whose sales fall below 5 million yuan and
firms who truly exit. Table 3.2 shows that over a 5-year horizon, 59% firms in the
1998 CIES data are no longer there in 2003, with a slightly lower number 56% over
2002-2007. These 5-year rates imply an annualized exit rate around 15% to 16%,
and is much higher than the annual 8% rate from a survival analysis report by
State Administration for Industry and Commerce in the manufacturing sector.13
Similar to entrants, the relative size of exiters are about 3 times large as their
counterparts in U.S. census data (Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1988).
Table 3.2: CIES Data Exiters over a 5-year Horizon
1998-2003 2002-2007
Number of Firms
Stayers 40.67% 44.34%
Data Exiters 59.33% 55.66%
Total Market Share
Stayers 59.91% 61.23%
Data Exiters 40.09% 38.77%
Relative Size of Output
Data Exiters 0.46 0.50
Stayers are defined as firms that are in CIES data for both year t and t+ 5. Data exiters are defined
as firms that are in CIES data for year t and absent for year t + 5.
The above analysis suggests that accounting for the threshold sales is impor-
tant to quantify how frictions shape misallocation through entry, exit and firm
dynamics. Several problems arise if one takes the CIES data as the entire man-
ufacturing sector in China. First, since firms that stay in the CIES data are rel-
atively large, the volatility of firm-level productivities is underestimated by using
the standard deviation of productivity in the cross-sectional data. This could lead
to a smaller misallocation in the simulated model (Asker, Collard-Wexler, and De
Loecker, 2014) that can hardly match that in the CIES data. Second, if old data
entrants are treated as new firms, misallocation on these firms is misleadingly at-
tributed to an initial misallocation on new firms. This bias is likely to be large,
since old data entrants are about a quarter in numbers and market shares.
Assigned Parameters The parameterization procedure takes two steps: as-
signed parameters from literature or other direct sources, and calibrated ones to
13See http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/tjzl/zxtjzl/xxzx/201307/P020130731318661073618.pdf
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match key moments in firm-level debt and productivity, as well as age and market
share distributions in China Industrial Enterprise Survey Data (CIES).
Capital adjustment costs are parameterized fromCooper andHaltiwanger (2006)
with a fixed cost parameter ξ = 0.039 and a convex adjustment cost parameter
θ = 0.049. The fixed cost free range for investment parameter ζ = 0.09, which is
equal to the capital deprecation rate δ = 0.09.
Firms’ discount factor β is set to 0.94, which implies an average prime borrowing
interest rate r2 = 1β − 1 = 0.06 according to People’s Bank of China (PBOC) annual
reports from 1998 to 2007. Similarly, saving interest rate is set r1 = 0.03 to match
the average deposit rate in PBOC reports.
Capital recovery rate γ2 upon default is set to 30%, which is the average asset
recovery rate of non-performing loans from 2001 to 2006 in China (Fan and Morck,
2013, p. 85). The cash recovery rate γ1 is lower than that of capital and equals 10%,
closer to the lower bound of cash recovery rate 6.90% reported in Fan and Morck
(2013).
Calibrated Parameters Given assigned parameters in the first step, the re-
maining parameters are calibrated to match key moments in firm-level debt, pro-
ductivity, as well as age and market share distributions in the CIES.
In the gross output production function, the labor share αl is set 0.05, which
is the wage bill fraction of gross output revenue (see Table B.1 in appendix). The
intermediate goods share αm is set to 0.7, between the number in Table 2.4 and
68% reported in Jones (2011). Since the capital share is unobserved, I calibrate
the return to scale parameter η to match the fact that 84.5% of total gross output is
produced by the top 10% firms in the manufacturing sector, which are equivalently
the top 50% firms in the CIES. The idea is that as η increases, gross output is more
concentrated on top producers in the sales distribution. This gives η = 0.85 and
consequently αk = 0.10.14
The threshold sale yc = 436.30 is chosen to have 20% of firms above this level
in the simulated gross output distribution. In other words, the subgroup of firms
with sales above yc in the simulated data is the model equivalent of the CIES data.
The productivity process parameters are calibrated to match the productivity
moments in the simulated top 20% firms to those in the CIES data.15 In particular,
14This is higher than an average capital share 0.06 when using an imputed rental rate 13% in
appendix A.2.
15In computation, the support of productivity is [µz − 4.5σz, µz + 4.5z] and discretized into 15 grids.
The AR(1) process is then discretized into a 15×15 transition matrix by Tauchen (1986)’s method.
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its persistence ρz = 0.7 is chosen to match the fact that 40.67% of firms in the 1998
CIES data remain by 2003. Since more than 50% of data exiters are estimated as
continuing firms, it is mainly the persistence of productivity ρ, not the operating
cost co, that shoves firms out of the CIES data. The mean µz = 0.9 and volatility
σz = 0.7 are calibrated so that the average and standard deviation for firm-level
productivity are 1.82 and 0.45 in the simulated top 20% firms as in the CIES data.
The debt limit log(b¯) determines access to credit. With a higher limit in the
future, the chance that firms are unable to roll over debt after a low productivity
shock is lower. Consequently, the incidence of exit and default is less likely, which
induces more borrowing by firms with q low net worth. Therefore, the level of log(b¯)
is chosen to match the fraction of firms access to credit in the simulated data to
that in the World Bank Data Survey 2012.16 For the empirical underpinnings, I
interpret firms’ debt in a more general form that includes borrowings from bank
and non-bank financial institutions, trade credit from suppliers and other borrow-
ings from friends, relatives and moneylenders in the World Bank data. This gives
a 34.29% of firms with debt and a calibrated debt limit log(b¯) = 6.096.
The population exit rate differs from the exit rate in the CIES, and is largely
determined by the operating cost co. The level is set to match the population exit
rate 8% during 2008-2012, according to the survival analysis report of firms by
State Administration for Industry and Commerce. The annual growth rate in the
manufacturing population during this period is approximately 9%, according to
censuses 2004 and 2008. To match this growth rate, the relative mass of entrants
µent is chosen to be 17%.
Entrants draw productivity from the unconditional distribution φ(z), and wealth
from the Pareto wealth distribution with a shape parameter α and a minimum
wealth amin. The productivity distribution of entrants is the same as that of incum-
bents. The shape parameter α and minimum wealth amin determines the distri-
bution of first-period output for entrants post entry. The fraction of intermediate
goods paid a period ahead ω impacts how fast a firm grows after birth, and there-
fore the relative market share over different ages and different percentiles of sales.
Thus, the three parameters α, amin and ω are jointly pinned down to match a 67.89%
market share of entrants in 2003, a 59% market share of data exiters in 1998, and
16The liability on accounting tables of the CIES is too noisy to be a good measure of debt, since it
includes several accounting items such as wages and pension payable, interest payable, customer
deposits etc. Instead, the World Bank Enterprise Survey 2012 asks firms specifically whether they
have borrowed for financing working capital and fixed capital investment, from banks, non-bank
financial institutions, suppliers and other sources.
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Table 3.3: Parametrization
Parametrized Calibrated
Parameter Value Parameter Value
Discounting factor β 0.94 Return to Scale η 0.85
Depreciation rate δ 0.09 Labor share αl 0.05
Capital Adjustment Cost Intermediate goods share αm 0.70
Fixed cost ξ 0.039 fraction of intermediate goods in advance ω 60%
Fixed cost free band ζ 0.09 Debt limit log(b¯) 6.10
Convex cost θ 0.049 Threshold sales yc 436.30
Interest Rates Operating cost co 5.00
Saving rate r1 0.03 Productivity Process
Prime borrowing rate r2 0.06 Population persistence of productivity ρz 0.70
Recovery Rates Population S. D. of productivity σz 0.70
Cash γ2 0.10 Unconditional mean µz 0.90
Capital γ1 0.30 Initial Wealth Distribution of Entrants
Mass of entrants µent 0.17
Pareto Shape α 0.60
Min. Wealth amin 20.00
a market share of new firms as 1.3 times as that of old data entrants in 2003.
Table 3.4: Targeted Moments
Moments Data Model
Market share by firms of top 10% sales 84.5% 87.5%
Population exit rate* 8% 5.8%
Frac. of firms above threshold 20% 20%
Frac. of firms with debt* 34.29% 34.60%
Mean productivity (Top 20% firms) 1.82 1.80
SD of productivity (Top 20% firms) 0.45 0.43
5-year Horizon
Frac. of CIES data exiters in t 59% 57.88%
Frac. of CIES data entrants in t + 5 67.89% 72.20%
Market share of CIES data exiters in t 40.09% 41.29%
Market share of CIES data entrants in t + 5 49.14% 56.38%
Market Share of Young Data Eantrants
Market Share of Old Data Entrants 1.3 1.3
Moments except for * are from the CIES data 1998-2003. The population exit rate is from a survival
analysis of firms in China by State Administration for Industry and Commerce. The fraction of
firms with debt is from World Bank Enterprise Survey 2012.
Table 3.3 lists all calibrated parameters and their levels, and Table 3.4 shows
the differences of targetedmoments in themodel and in the data. Themodel overall
replicates these key moments in the data with some room to improve on the exit
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rate and the market share of CIES data entrants in t + 5.
Out of Model Fit To check whether the calibrated model reasonably captures
the frictions that firms in the CIES data face, I compare the dynamics of a given
cohort in the simulation to that in the CIES data for 6 years after their entry.
The specific dynamics presented here is how productivity, capital and sales of
a given cohort converge to those of all firms, both in the CIES data and in the
simulated top 20% subgroup. Since the CIES data only includes the top 20% of
manufacturing firms, I assume that only the top 20% of the simulated data are
observable every period. This suggests that firms of a given cohort that are ob-
servable may not be the same set of firms every year. For example, in the 1998
CIES data, 5024 firms report that their birth years are 1998. In 1999, 801 of the
5024 firms disappear from the CIES data, while another 3038 firms of the 1998
cohort who are below the threshold sales in 1998 enter into the 1999 CIES data.17
I focus on the 1998 cohort of the CIES since it provides the longest observation
window. Figure 3.2, 3.3 and 3.4 plot the differences in average log productivity, log
capital and log sale between a birth cohort and all firms, both in the CIES data and
in the simulated top 20% firms over 6 years post birth. In Figure 3.2, the model
replicates two features of productivity for the 1998 cohort in the CIES data. First,
firms of the birth cohort that produce above threshold sales outperform other firms
in productivity. Since most entrants start from a low capital stock (see Figure 3.3),
those producing more than the threshold sales must have a higher productivity.
Second, such a productivity advantage decays over time. The decaying effect is due
to the Markovian process of productivity, and a lower level productivity needed to
be included in the CIES data or top 20% firms by a growing average capital for the
birth cohort, as evident (see Figure 3.3). Combining productivity and capital, log
sales of birth firms first grow then get stable in Figure 3.4.18 Overall, the model
delivers a similar pattern of firm dynamics to that observed in CIES data.19
17See Table B.4 in appendix for more details. Table B.4 also compares entry and exit of the
simulated top 20% subgroup for a given cohort over time to that in the CIES data.
18I also look at 1999-2006 cohorts. The general pattern of decaying productivity, growing capital
stock and sales hold in other cohorts. However, from 1998 to 2006, the relative log productivity
of a birth cohort compared to all firms in the CIES data is declining over time, while the average
firm-level productivity in the CIES grows. One explanation is that firm-level productivity growth,
e.g. through R&D, takes place on incumbent firms rather than on new firms.
19The dip of log capital in Figure 3.3 is due to intermediate goods frictions. Note that these firms
enter at time t = −1, and prepare in t = −1 before productions in t = 0. At time t = −1, the birth
cohort have no retained earnings from the past and are constrained in intermediate goods m0. At
time t = 0, firms have retained earnings from the production and are therefore less constrained
in intermediate goods choice m1 than in t = −1. As a result, firms enter into t = 1 with more pre-
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Figure 3.2: Diff. in Log Productivity of a Given Cohort Compared to All Firms
above the Threshold Sales, Data vs Model
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The cohort for the CIES data is 1998 cohort. ∆ log productivity is defined as the difference of log
productivity between 1998 cohort and all firms in the CIES data. A similar definition applies for
the simulated top 20% firms in the model.
Figure 3.3: Diff. in Log Capital of a Given Cohort Compared to All Firms above
the Threshold Sales, Data vs Model
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The cohort for the CIES data is 1998 cohort. ∆ log capital is defined as the difference of log capital
between 1998 cohort and all firms in the CIES data. A similar definition applies for the simulated
top 20% firms in the model.
ordered intermediate goods, and hence have lower capital stocks on average to produce more than
the threshold sales. A similar argument applies to the spike in productivity (see Figure 3.2).
Chapter 3. Intermediate Goods Frictions and Misallocation in China 52
Figure 3.4: Diff. in Log Sale of a Given Cohort Compared to All Firms above
Threshold Sales, Data vs Model
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The cohort for the CIES data is 1998 cohort. ∆ log sale is defined as the difference of log sale between
1998 cohort and all firms in the CIES data. A similar definition applies for the simulated top 20%
firms in the model.
3.3.2 Misallocation: Model vs Data
This section compares measured misallocation in the calibrated model with that
in the CIES data. I compute measured misallocation as the percentage of gross
output gain if marginal products of intermediate goods, capital and labor were
equalized across firms. I find that the gross output gain averages 140% of actual
gross output in the CIES data over 1998-2007, and 96% in the simulated top 20%
firms. Overall, the model accounts for 69% of misallocation that is measured in the
CIES data.
Measured Misallocation Following Hsieh and Klenow (2009) and Midrigan
and Xu (2014), measured misallocation quantifies the potential output gain by re-
allocating inputs to equalize marginal products across firms, given a fixed distri-
bution distribution of firm-level productivity. My measure of misallocation differs,
however, in that the output refers to gross output rather than value-added.
Given n firms with capital stock ki, labor employment li, intermediate goods mi
and actual gross output yi for each firm i, a hypothetically efficient aggregate Ye f f is
calculated by reallocating ki, li and mi to equate marginal products of capital MPk,
labor MPl and intermediate goods MPm, holding aggregate capital
∑
i ki , interme-
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diate goods ∑imi and labor ∑i li constant. This potential output Ye f f is achievable
when all inputs are adjustable intra period without frictions, assuming that firms
purchase inputs in a competitive markets without any distortions. In other words,
Ye f f is the first-best gross output if there is a social planner that maximizes the
sum of firm-level gross output, facing no real and financial frictions. Measured
misallocation is calculated:
Measured Misallocation =
Ye f f − Y
Y
(3.24)
while Y = ∑i yi is the actual aggregate gross output in the data.
Misallocation in the CIES Data Using Equation (3.24), I compute the mea-
sured misallocation in the CIES data each year over 1998-2007. Since there are
a range of industries in the CIES data, the efficient output Ye f f is computed to
equalize marginal products within each 2-digit CIC industry.
Several pre-treatments on firm-level productivities are required for two rea-
sons. First, the distribution of firm-level productivities in the CIES data exhibits
thicker left and right tails than the log normal distribution in the model. Since
the hypothetical efficient output Ye f f is sensitive to tail values in the productivity
distribution,20 I trim the productivity distribution in the CIES to make the data
and the model share the same support of firm-level productivities. Second, there is
a growth on average firm-level productivities in the CIES data, from 1.82 in 1998
to 2.12 in 2007, which is absent in the model. Therefore, the trimming scheme is
adapted to take this growth into account. Specifically, in 1998, the range of pro-
ductivity in CIES data is trimmed to be [µz − 4.5σz, µz + 4.5σz] to match that in the
model computation. In later years, the ranges are adjusted to be [µz+∆z−4.5σz, µz+
∆z + 4.5σz], while ∆z is the difference in productivity of a given year compared to
1998 (see Table B.2 in Appendix).
Table 3.5 presents themeasuredmisallocation in the CIES data over 1998-2007.
The average 1.4 suggests that if marginal products of inputs were hypothetically
equalized, gross output in the CIES data could be 2.4 times that of actual gross
output. A general declining trend in output gain exists from 1998 to 2003, and
from 2004 to 2007. There is an increase of 25 percentage points in 2004, which is
20In the most extreme case, if there is a small fraction of firms with extremely high productivities
yet not much inputs, the gross output gain would be tremendous. Therefore, one must take a stand
whether these firms are outliers compared to firms in the model. This is more a problem when the
return to scale gets closer to 1. My view here is that the productivity range in the CIES must be
consistent with the calibrated model.
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Table 3.5: Gross Output Gain by Equalizing Marginal Products within 2-digit CIC
Industry, CIES
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 Average
Gross Output Gain 1.68 1.43 1.54 1.29 1.33 1.15 1.40 1.35 1.26 1.24 1.40
potentially caused by the fact that the data entry rate in this year is more than
50%, much higher than 20% in other years during 1998-2007.21
Misallocation in the Model How does the model perform in accounting for
the measured misallocation in the CIES data in Table 3.5? I compute the gross
output gain in the simulated top 20% firms, which is the model equivalent of the
CIES data.22 Since the model does not distinguish industries, marginal products
are equalized across all top 20% firms to calculate the efficient gross output. Table
3.6 presents that the gross output gain is 96% in the model, suggesting that the
gross output would almost double if marginal products were equalized. Compared
to the CIES data, the model accounts for close to 70% of misallocation in the data.
Table 3.6: Gross Output Gain, CIES Data vs Top 20% Firms in Model Simulation
CIES Data 1998-2007 Model Model % of Data
1.40 0.96 69.34%
3.3.3 Decomposing Misallocation
The benchmark model has four frictions: borrowing constraints and real frictions
on both intermediate goods and capital. How much does each friction account for
themeasuredmisallocation in the calibratedmodel? More importantly, do frictions
on intermediate goods help to account for more misallocation, on top of a standard
investment model with capital frictions? To answer these questions, I carry out
21 Such a high entry rate is possibly due to the fact that the First Economic Census takes place
in 2004, which includes a set of firms that have sales barely at 5 million yuan, and avoid reporting
to National Bureau of Statistics prior 2004 (Holz, 2013)
22The measured misallocation in the simulated top 20% firms does not differ much from that in
the simulated manufacturing population (see Table B.3 in Appendix). This is sensible since the
CIES data produces 90% of manufacturing gross output in 2004.
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Table 3.7: Model Specifications of Counterfactual Experiments
Friction Benchmark Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
Real Frictions on Capital    
Borrowing Constraints on Capital   
Real Frictions on Intermediate Goods  
Borrowing Constraints on Intermediate Goods 
counterfactual experiments that remove the frictions one by one from the bench-
mark model. The counterfactual experiments proceed in the following order:
• Experiment 1 (Exp. 1) removes the borrowing constraint on intermediate
goods. Specifically, payment for next period intermediate goods, ωm′, enters
into firms’ objective function, but not into the endogenous borrowing con-
straint (see Equation 3.7). One interpretation of this counterfactual is that
firms cannot default on any borrowings for intermediate goods purchases. Or,
whenever firms default on these borrowings, intermediate goods can be seized
and sold without any costs by the lenders, who are most likely intermediate
goods suppliers in practice.
• Experiment 2 (Exp. 2) further removes pre-order on intermediate goods by
allowing firms to choose the static optimal amount of intermediate goods after
productivity shocks. In other words, firms solve optimal labor l and interme-
diate goods m intra period:
max
l,m
y(z, k, l,m) − m − l (3.25)
The resulting intermediate goods mstatic is static optimal. This specification is
close to the modern sector part of Midrigan and Xu (2014) but with capital
adjustment costs.
• Experiment 3 (Exp. 3) further removes borrowing constraints on capital by
allowing negative dividends or new equity issuance. This is essentially Asker,
Collard-Wexler, andDe Loecker (2014) or a gross output version of Cooper and
Haltiwanger (2006) but with entry and exit.
Table 3.7 lists which frictions are included under benchmark and counterfac-
tual specifications. In each experiment, the counterfactual model is simulated to
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obtain a new stationary distribution given calibrated parameters from the bench-
mark model. The threshold sales ycs are recalculated so that there are always 20%
firms above the threshold. Given these top 20% firms under each counterfactual
experiment with their actual output yi, I calculate measured misallocation as in
Equation (3.24). This exercise answers the question how much gross output gain
would be if firms in the CIES behaved as in Exp. 1, 2 and 3, if marginal products
of all inputs were equalized. Results are presented in Table 3.8.
Borrowing Constraints on Intermediate Goods In Exp. 1, gross output
gain would be 0.64 times the actual output Y, if marginal products of capital, labor
and intermediate goods were equalized among the top 20% simulated firms. Com-
pared to the gain of 0.96 in the benchmark model, the gross output gain in Exp.
1 is 0.32 lower. Therefore, measured misallocation in Exp. 1 accounts for 46.69%
of that in the CIES data, which is 22.65 percentage points lower than that in the
benchmark model. This implies that borrowing constraints on intermediate goods
account for 22.65% of measured misallocation in the CIES data.
Borrowing constraints on intermediate goods generate measured misallocation
through three channels. First, since intermediate goods is 70% of revenue, a posi-
tive down-payment for intermediate goods increases the borrowing need and tight-
ens the borrowing constraint. Roughly, for each $1 of expected sales in the next
period, $0.42 of intermediate goods have to be financed on top of capital invest-
ment. This increases the amount of borrowing that are subject to the default risk
from the lenders’ view. Further, this increase of borrowing need is recurrent since
intermediate goods depreciate in one-period.
Second, at time t, capital investment kt+1− (1− δ)kt could be crowded out because
of the borrowing need for intermediate goods mt+1. Since capital serves as better
collateral than intermediate goods, the level of collateral decreases, causing amore
tightened constraint from time t and on.
Third, while pre-order on intermediate goods reduces profits and lowers capital
investment, borrowing constraints on intermediate goods prolong this negative ef-
fect. At time t, firms cannot achieve the static optimal intermediate goods mstatic if
the pre-ordered level mt is too low. With a lower current profit, next period capital
kt+1 is lower than without pre-order. If there is no borrowing constraints on inter-
mediate goods, firms could react to order more intermediate goods mt+1 for t + 1 by
the persistence of productivities. This increases profit in t + 1 and consequently
alleviates the negative effect on capital from time t + 2 and on. With borrowing
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Table 3.8: Simulated Output Gain by Equalizing Marginal Products, Benchmark vs Counterfactuals
Model Specifications
Benchmark Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
Potential Gain % of Data Potential Gain % of Data Potential Gain % of Data Potential Gain % of Data
0.96 69.34% 0.64 46.69% 0.49 35.62% 0.48 34.75%
Each Friction:
B.C. on Intm. Goods 0.32 22.65%
R.F. on Intm. Goods 0.15 11.07%
B.C. on Capital 0.01 0.87 %
R.F. on Capital 0.48 34.75%
B.C. on Intm. Goods: Borrowing constraints on intermediate goods; R.F. on Intm. Goods: Real frictions on intermediate goods; B.C. on Capital:
Borrowing constraints on capital; R.F. on Capital: Real Frictions on Capital.
Benchmark includes all four frictions. Exp. 1 removes borrowing constraints on intermediate Goods. Exp 2 further removes real frictions on
intermediate goods. Exp 3 lastly removes borrowing constraints on capital.
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Table 3.9: Effect of Inadequate Intermediate Goods β3 on Future Capital, Bench-
mark vs Exp. 1
Benchmark Exp. 1
t + 1 -0.5722 -0.3196
t + 2 -0.5389 -0.0012
t + 3 -0.4331 0.0222
t + 4 -0.3270 0.0241
t + 5 -0.2727 -0.0073
Benchmark includes all four frictions. Exp. 1 removes borrowing constraints on intermediate
Goods.
constraints on intermediate goods, however, firms are constrained in the amount
of intermediate goods mt+1 they can order. Therefore, the status of inadequate in-
termediate goods persists, keeps the constraint tight in t+ 1, and so forth. In other
words, the negative effect on capital persists over time.
To illustrate the second and the third channels at time t, I regress capital in
the following periods logki,t+∆,∆ ≥ 1, on a dummy of inadequate intermediate goods,
Dummy(mt < mstatic) in t, controlling for starting state variables of productivity zit,
capital logki,t, and debt/saving level bi,t:
logki,t+∆ = β0 + β1zi,t + β2logki,t + β2bi,t + β3Dummy(mt < mstatic)i,t + residual (3.26)
among the top 20% simulated firms in the benchmark model and in Exp. 1. The
idea is that without intermediate goods frictions, firms with the same state vari-
ables (zt, bt, kt) choose the same capital kt+1 in t+1. With intermediate goods frictions,
a firm that has a lower productivity zt−1 and capital kt−1 in t− 1, and chooses a lower
intermediate goods mt is in a disadvantage situation in choosing capital kt+1. Equa-
tion (3.26) quantifies the impact of such a disadvantage on future capital.
Table 3.9 gives estimates of β3 in both Benchmark and Exp. 1. In the benchmark
model, the impact of inadequate intermediate goods lowers next period capital by
57%, 25 percentage points higher than in Exp.1 due to the second channel. The
negative effect in Benchmark prolongs to time t + 5 with a negative impact of 27%,
due to the third channel. In contrast, next period capital only decreases by 32% in
Exp. 1 and such a negative effect almost vanishes in one period.
Because of the three channels, the capital accumulation process is consequently
slower when borrowing constraints on intermediate goods are on. In Figure 5,
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Figure 3.5: Diff. in Log Capital of A Birth Cohort Compared to All Firms above
Threshold Sales, Benchmark vs Counterfactuals
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Benchmark includes all four frictions. Exp. 1 removes borrowing constraints on intermediate
Goods. Exp. 2 further removes pre-order on intermediate goods. Exp. 3 lastly removes borrow-
ing constraints on capital.
Table 3.10: Log Gross Output and Log Capital Distributions, Benchmark vs Coun-
terfactuals
Model Specifications
Percentile Benchmark Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3
log y log k log y log k log y log k log y log k
10% 6.27 4.06 6.92 6.02 7.36 5.04 7.64 6.50
25% 6.40 5.53 7.51 6.34 7.70 6.34 8.20 7.80
50% 7.29 6.34 8.20 7.15 8.70 8.45 9.18 9.27
75% 8.14 6.50 9.74 8.94 9.74 9.27 10.00 9.92
90% 9.24 7.48 10.85 9.75 11.24 9.92 11.37 9.92
Mean 7.46 6.04 7.98 7.49 9.04 7.84 9.33 8.83
Distribution for each specification is within the subgroup of top 20% firms. Benchmark includes
all four frictions. Exp. 1 removes borrowing constraints on intermediate Goods. Exp. 2 further
removes pre-order on intermediate goods. Exp. 3 lastly removes borrowing constraints on capital.
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average log capital for a birth cohort takes 6 years to converge to the average of
all top 20% firms in the benchmark model, and only 3 years in the Exp. 1. The
resulting firm size distribution also differs. Table 3.10 illustrates that compared to
Exp. 1, the benchmark has uniformly lower log capital on all percentiles with 145%
lower average capital. Consequently, average sales is 52% lower in the benchmark
model than in Exp. 1.
Pre-Order on Intermediate Goods Exp. 2 further removes the real friction
of pre-order on intermediate goods. Table 3.8 shows that if firms in the CIES data
behaved as in the model of Exp. 2, the potential output gain would be 0.49 times
the actual output Y, which accounts for 35.62% of measured misallocation in the
CIES. The difference of 11.07% between Exp. 1 and Exp. 2 is therefore attributed
to pre-order on intermediate goods.
In Exp. 1, since firms cannot purchase intermediate goods above the pre-ordered
level, there exists a pre-cautionary motive for investment in intermediate goods.
Consequently, the pre-ordered level of intermediate goods m′ is on average 16 times
of that used in the production.
Despite the pre-cautionary motive, the choice of next period intermediate goods
m′ is influenced by an expected return that is determined by the distribution of
future productivity, and capital stock in the next period. Therefore, firms may
have a pre-ordered level of intermediate goods lower than the static optimal level
after high productivity shocks are realized. Table 3.11 shows that there are 31.12%
of these firms among the top 20% group, and 16.57% among all simulated firms.
These firms have a unsurprisingly higher productivity, 42.7% higher among the
top 20% firms and 10.42% higher among all simulated firms. They also tend to
have a lower capital stock, 86.86% lower among top 20% firms and 42.19% lower
among all simulated firms, which rationalizes a lower marginal return and a lower
option value of ordering intermediate goods a period ahead.
Real frictions also lowers the capital investment through a lower current profit.
However, as shown in Table 3.9, this effect is short-lived. This is because firms
react to the high productivity by investing a high level of next period intermediate
goods, which soon increases the next period profit and capital investment. As a
result, the average capital in Exp. 1 is 35% lower than in Exp. 2, smaller than the
difference of 145% between Benchmark and Exp. 1.
Borrowing Constraints on Capital Exp. 3 further removes borrowing con-
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Table 3.11: Intermediate Goods Usage Compared to the Static Optimal, Simulated
Exp. 2
Frac. of Average Log Productivity Average Log Capital
Smaller Equal Smaller Equal Smaller
Top 20% Firms 31.12% 1.7474 2.1744 7.7653 6.8967
All Firms 16.57% 0.8838 0.9880 6.1316 5.7097
Subgroup Smaller (Equal): firms with intermediate goods usage in Exp. 2 smaller than (equal) the
static optimal level. Exp 2 removes borrowing constraints and real frictions on intermediate goods.
straints on capital. Table 3.8 presents that in a model with only one-period time-
to-build and capital adjustment costs, the gross output gain is 0.48 of actual gross
output Y, if marginal products of capital, labor and intermediate goods were equal-
ized across firms. This is close to the 0.49 in Exp. 2, and suggests that borrowing
constraints on capital only account for 0.87% ofmeasuredmisallocation in the CIES
data.
One may argue that the small output loss is driven by restricting attention
to firms in the top 20% of sales distribution, as these firms are relatively uncon-
strained. There may still exist many firms that are constrained and below the
threshold sales such that removing borrowing constraints on capital increases out-
put significantly among all firms. Yet if I calculate measured misallocation among
all simulated firms in Exp. 2 and Exp. 3, the results are similar to that in Table
3.8. The potential output gain is 0.52 in Exp. 2, and 0.51 in Exp. 3.
The small output loss from borrowing constraints on capital, however, does not
indicate firms are unconstrained. In Figure 3.5, capital accumulation with the con-
straint takes more than 5 years to converge to the average log capital among top
20% firms, slower than the case without the constraint. As a result, percentiles
of log capital distribution in Table 3.10 with the constraint are lower than those
without the constraint, except for the 90 percentile. The seeming contradiction of
a small output loss and a lower average capital stock is reconciled by the fact that
the most productive firms have high capital stocks with and without the constraint.
Since most output is produced by these top productive firms,23 reallocating inputs
does not increase more output gain despite an average lower capital with the con-
straint. Table 3.12 illustrates this point. If I calculate the fraction of capital stock
owned by firms above log productivity 2.25 (75 percentile of the productivity distri-
23This property is called granularity, see Xavier (2011).
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bution), the number is 53% in Exp. 2 with borrowing constraints on capital, and
a similar fraction 57% in Exp. 3 without. In terms of output, they produce a very
similar fraction of aggregate output at 97% in Exp. 2 and Exp. 3. A qualitatively
similar result holds for the 99 percentile of productivity 3.15.
Table 3.12: Fraction of Gross Output Produced and Owned by Top Productive
Firms, Top 20% Simulated Firms
Exp. 2 Exp. 3
Log Productivity Productivity Frac. of Frac. of Frac. Of Frac. Of
Above Percentile Agg. Output Agg. Capital Agg. Output Agg. Capital
3.15 99% 71.3% 14.5% 71.3% 11.5%
2.25 75% 97.1% 53.4% 97.4% 56.7%
Exp 2 removes borrowing constraints and real frictions on intermediate goods. Exp 3 further re-
moves borrowing constraints on capital.
Compared to the literature, this finding of a small output loss from borrowing
constraints on capital is unsurprising. Midrigan and Xu (2014) andMoll (2014) ad-
dress that self-financing can undo misallocation caused by borrowing constraints
on capital, which is also true in this paper as firms can save and productivities are
persistent. As Hopenhayn (2014) points out, the impact of financial constraints on
misallocation may be larger, given a high entry with young and constrained firms.
However, this paper shows that with capital adjustment costs slowing down the
growth of firms, a high entry rate of 17% in China, about two times in Midrigan
and Xu (2014), does not magnify the role of borrowing constraints on capital in ac-
counting for misallocation. Unless there are other frictions that further slow down
the growth of firms, it could be hard to get a sizable misallocation by simply feeding
in more entrants.
Real Frictions on Capital The remained frictions in Exp. 3 are one-period
time-to-build and adjustment costs for capital. The channels of these two fric-
tions are well addressed in the investment literature, e.g. Cooper and Haltiwanger
(2006) andKhan andThomas (2008), and in themisallocation literature, e.g. Asker,
Collard-Wexler, and De Loecker (2014). First, because of one-period time-to-build,
capital stock determined a period ahead is not static optimal after stochastic pro-
ductivity shocks. Second, due to the fixed and convex adjustment costs, firms that
would like to adjust capital to a certain level may find it too costly to do.
Table 3.8 presents that in Exp. 3, gross output gain is 0.48 if marginal prod-
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ucts of capital, labor and intermediate goods were equalized across firms, which ac-
counts for about 35% ofmeasuredmisallocation in the CIES data. Without frictions
on intermediate goods and borrowing constraints on capital, the capital threshold
for top 20% firms in sales are effectively lower, and capital accumulation is pretty
fast. In Figure 3.5, a birth cohort starts from an average capital much lower than
the mean of all firms in the top 20% group, and converges to the mean in 3 years.
This accumulation speed is much faster than that in the CIES data in Figure 3.3.
3.3.4 Bias in Value Added Misallocation
In parallel to my discussion of biased value added misallocation in Section 2.4 in
Chapter 2, this section explores whether value added approach in literature also
underestimates value added misallocation in the model.
Table 3.13 presents value added gains under the value added approach and
gross output approach, for both simulated data and China’s data. The calculation
is the same as in Section 2.4 in Chapter 2. In the model, when I reallocate cap-
ital and labor based on firm-level value added productivity, value added gain is
67%. However, if intermediate goods is reallocated along with capital and labor,
value added gain is 203%. In short, value added approach in the literature also
underestimates the magnitude of value added misallocation in the model.
Table 3.13: Value Added Gains under Value Added Approach and Gross Output
Approach, Model vs Data
Value added approach in literature Gross output approach
Data Model Data Model
Value added gain 98.12% 66.76% 550.74% 203.48%
Source of the bias in value added approach partly comes from biased value
added productivity. As discussed in Section 2.4, the correlation between interme-
diate goods distortions and gross output productivity matters for the direction of
either an underestimated or an overestimated value added productivity for firms
with high gross output productivities. While there may exist intermediate goods
distortions that work in both directions in the data,24 mechanisms in this model
24For example, financial frictions on intermediate goods lead to a wedge on intermediate goods
that is positively correlated with gross output productivity. In other scenarios, productive firms
in gross output could have an advantage in access to more intermediate goods suppliers and thus
have a lower wedge on intermediate goods.
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Figure 3.6: Non-linear Mapping Between Log Value Added and Log Gross Output
Productivities, Model
lead to a positively correlation between intermediate goods distortion and gross
output productivity. Specifically, because of financial constraints on intermediate
goods, firms with a high gross output productivity desire to invest a large volume
of intermediate goods but are constrained to do so. For this reason, value added
productivity is lower for constrained firms than their unconstrained counterparts
with the same level of gross output productivity. This can be seen evidently in
Figure 3.6, where the mass of constrained firms is nonzero when log gross output
productivity is greater than 0.9.
Summary This section first compares gross output misallocation in model and
data. Overall, the model accounts for 69% of gross output misallocation in CIES
data.
This section further decomposes the model simulated misallocation in Section
3.3.2 into contributions by borrowing constraints and real frictions on intermediate
goods and capital. Out of 69% CIES measured misallocation by the model, I find
that real frictions on capital and borrowing constraints on intermediate goods ac-
count for themost measuredmisallocation in the CIES data by 34.75% and 22.65%,
respectively. Real frictions on intermediate goods account for another 11.07%while
borrowing constraints on capital account for a negligible 0.87%. In other words,
new frictions proposed in this chapter on intermediate goods can account for an
extra 33.72% of misallocation in China, on top of the misallocation caused by cap-
ital frictions that has been well studied in the literature.
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Lastly, this section compares value addedmisallocationmeasures in value added
approach and gross output approach in the model. I find that consistent with the
findings in data, value addedmisallocation under the value added approach is 67%,
and underestimates the true misallocation 203% under the gross output approach.
3.4 Conclusion
This chapter introduces borrowing constraints and pre-order on intermediate goods
and quantifies their role in accounting for measured misallocation in the CIES
data. I incorporate these intermediate goods frictions, as well as borrowing con-
straints on capital, into a standard firm investmentmodel Cooper andHaltiwanger
(2006) with entry and exit. When calibrated to key moments in China, I find that
the model generates substantial misallocation, and accounts for 69% of that in the
CIES data. A further decomposition shows that frictions on intermediate goods
are quantitatively important. They account for about a half of the model gener-
ated misallocation, and about 34% of misallocation in the CIES data. In particular,
borrowing constraints account for a third and around a quarter of misallocation in
the model and in the CIES data, respectively. Real frictions on capital are also
important and account for a similar magnitude of misallocation as intermediate
goods frictions. Consistent with the literature, I find that borrowing constraints
on capital generate little misallocation.
There are several future extensions for this project. First, in the current ver-
sion, costs in intermediate goods and capital are in one borrowing constraint. It
can be, however, separated into two with one working capital constraint on current
period intermediate goods, and one borrowing constraints on capital. This alter-
native setting will keep the negative effect of borrowings for intermediate goods on
capital, as long as competitive lenders observe both types of borrowings. An upper
limit for the current period intermediate goods would be the result of the working
capital constraint. This benefits in relaxing the assumption that firms cannot buy
intermediate goods above the pre-ordered level in the current version. Second, the
partial equilibrium stand on intermediate goods, labor and output markets can be
extended into a general equilibrium analysis. Output of each firm can be used as
final goods consumed by households, and also intermediate goods for other firms,
as in Basu (1995). If inputs are misallocated at the first place by mechanisms stud-
ied in this paper, most productive firms cannot produce and supply a large amount
of output in the intermediate goods market. The extra effect, studied by Jones
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(2011) and Bartelme and Gorodnichenko (2015), could increase prices of interme-
diate goods, which could further create misallocation by worsening the financing
problem for productive constrained firms.
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Chapter 4
Left-Censored CIES Data and
Source of China’s TFP Growth
4.1 Introduction
China’s total factor productivity (TFP) grew at a rate of 3.9% during 1999-2007 be-
fore the 2008 financial crisis (see Figure 4.1).1 Most of the TFP growth comes from
the industrial sector (Brandt and Zhu, 2010; Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang,
2012), which has undergone a massive entry of new firms and policy reforms.2 One
natural question is about the source of this high TFP growth. Is it the case that
Chinese firms are becoming more productive over time? Or is the growth from re-
source reallocations among existing firms? Or is it driven by the entry of new and
more productive firms?
This paper builds on the aggregate productivity decomposition literature which
has been used to study the U.S. manufacturing sector (Baily, Hulten, and Camp-
bell, 1992; Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan, 2001). Using the China Industrial
Enterprise Survey (CIES) data, I define aggregate productivity as the gross out-
put weighted sum of firm-level productivity. The aggregate productivity is then
decomposed into three components: technological growth, intensive reallocation
and extensive reallocation. The first component, technological growth, measures
the average firm-level productivity growth, while the second and the third measure
1An alternative estimate of China’s TFP growth during 1998-2007 is 4.68% in Zhu (2012), where
the agricultural sector grows at 4.13%, the non state non-agricultural sector grows at 3.67%, and
the state non-agricultural sector grows at 5.5 %.
2Number of firms in China Industrial Enterprise Survey (CIES) data increased from 147,690 to
304,599 during 1998-2007. Major reforms include privatization of loss-making state owned firms,
drops in inter-provincial migration and trade costs, bankruptcy law reforms, interest rate liberal-
ization and accession to WTO (Xu, 2011; Zhu, 2012).
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Figure 4.1: Aggregate TFP Growth in China, 1999-2014
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changes in firm-level weights through resource reallocations. The intensive real-
location evaluates reallocations among continuing firms, and the extensive one is
about whether more productive entrants replace less productive exiters over time.
The decomposition exercise, however, faces a potential bias when applied di-
rectly in the CIES data. Unlike the U.S. census data used in the literature, the
CIES includes all state owned firms, and non state owned firms with sales more
than 5 million yuan. According to The First Economic Census 2004 (see Table 2.3
in Chapter 2), there are about 80% manufacturing firms, all non state owned, that
are not included in the dataset. Therefore, the entry and exit of firms in the CIES
are not defined in the same way as in the U.S. census data.
Does this left-censoring data limitation cause a quantitatively significant bias
on decomposing manufacturing productivity growth in the CIES? To answer these
questions, this paper develops a method to recover the true technological growth,
intensive and extensive reallocations in China’s manufacturing sector. I first im-
pose assumptions that the firm-level productivity process is AR(1), that firms close
exogenously, that the correlation between market share and productivity is con-
stant over the sales distribution, and that log sales in the manufacturing sector
follows a Pareto distribution. Under these assumptions, I show that the three
components can be recovered using CIES and several aggregate statistics on firms
whose sales are less than 5 million yuan.
To investigate whether the productivity decomposition is biased in the CIES, I
first take CIES as the manufacturing universe, and carry out the Baily, Hulten,
and Campbell (1992)’s version of decomposition exercise (henceforth BHC decom-
Chapter 4. Left-Censored CIES Data and Source of China’s TFP Growth 73
position). Similar exercises have bee done in Van Biesebroeck (2008), Brandt, Van
Biesebrock, and Zhang (2014) and Ding, Guariglia, and Harris (2016) using other
methodologies. Then I use my method to correct for the left-censoring problem and
re-do the decomposition. In preparing for the correction exercise, the AR(1) produc-
tivity process is consistently estimated, taking account of the selection problem in
the left-censored CIES data. I also calibrate the log sales distributions for all firms
and firms younger than 5 years old.
The direct productivity decomposition in the CIES suggests that manufactur-
ing productivity grows 18% over 1998-2003 and 16% over 2002-2007. Extensive
reallocation through net entry contributes 93% and 144% of these growths for the
two periods, respectively. Intensive reallocation, i.e. reallocation of inputs across
existing firms, contributes -10% and -93% to the aggregate productivity growth
over 1998-2003 and 2002-2007. The rest 17% and 49% are contributed by techno-
logical growth at the firm-level. This contrasts to the estimates based on U.S. data
that intensive reallocation contributes at least 20% of 5-year aggregate productiv-
ity growth across business cycles, while extensive reallocation barely contributes
to the growth (Baily, Hulten, and Campbell, 1992). This China-U.S. difference can-
not be accounted by more entrants in the CIES, neither can the existence of state
owned firms.
The left-censoring problem partially explains the difference in productivity de-
composition between China and U.S.. After corrected for the left-censoring, I find
that the fraction of aggregate productivity growth accounted by extensive reallo-
cation drops to 74% and 85% in 1998-2003 and 2002-2007, respectively. Most of
the drops are picked up by higher intensive reallocations. In 1998-2003, inten-
sive reallocation increases the aggregate productivity by 4.53%, and contributes to
24% of its growth. In 2002-2007, while the intensive reallocation is still negative,
it lowers aggregate productivity by -7%, which is half of -14% in the direct CIES
decomposition, and contributes -40% of its growth. Corrected results for technolog-
ical growth are more mixed. In 1998-2003, because firms that decline in sales and
exit from CIES experience more negative productivity changes, the contribution
from technological growth drops to 2%. The opposite happens in 2002-2007 and
technological growth contributes to 54% of aggregate productivity growth.
The corrected decomposition differs from the naive estimates in the CIES for
two reasons. First, manufacturing firms with sales less than 5 million are ne-
glected in the direct CIES decomposition. These firms actually increase aggregate
productivity by 1% through intensive reallocation and at least another 1% through
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technological growth in 1998-2003 and 2002-2007. Second, incumbent firms that
grow and decline in sales, and cross the 5 million cutoff are mis-classified as en-
trants and exiters in the direct CIES decomposition. Therefore, the extensive real-
location is biased upward and the intensive reallocation is biased downward if one
takes CIES as the manufacturing universe. The movements of these firms across
the 5 million minimum sales increase aggregate productivity by about 4% in both
1998-2003 and 2002-2007.
To check the robustness of my procedure, I create a hypothetical dataset with
10 million as the minimum sales. In particular, these measures of technological
growth, intensive and extensive reallocations in the manufacturing sector are close
to that in the CIES when I redo the correction exercise in the hypothetical data.
Furthermore, the qualitative results of upward biased extensive reallocation and
downward biased intensive reallocation also hold for the non state owned manu-
facturing sector.
This paper is related to the literature about micro-level channels of aggregate
productivity growth in China. Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang (2012) esti-
mated firm-level productivity in the CIES, and finds that net entry drives most
output-weighted aggregate productivity growth during the same period 1998-2007.
Similar results can be found in Van Biesebroeck (2008) and Ding, Guariglia, and
Harris (2016). Built on earlier studies, this paper contributes to the discussion by
finding that the left-censoring problem in China’s data biases the importance of
net entry in growth upward.
This paper also relates to the aggregate productivity decomposition literature
that mainly focuses on the U.S. manufacturing sector. Baily, Hulten, and Camp-
bell (1992) developed the methodology of output-weighted aggregate productivity
growth used in this paper. Similar decomposition methods were followed by Fos-
ter, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001) and Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta
(2004), of which the latter studies cross-country differences in intensive realloca-
tion.3 Compared to these studies, this paper develops a new method that intends
to recover the decomposition in the manufacturing sector when only left-censored
data are available.
3Other popular decomposition methods include Olley and Pakes (1996) and Petrin and Levin-
sohn (2012). Each decomposition method has its own advantage. For example, Petrin and Levin-
sohn (2012) has a better macroeconomic consistency, since their aggregated firm-level productivity
equals to the one used in the representative firm framework. This paper uses Baily, Hulten, and
Campbell (1992)’s approach because it is more intuitive and provides detailed stylized facts in the
U.S. manufacturing sector. I leave the differences of aggregate productivity decomposition by dif-
ferent methods for future research.
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This paper is lastly related to the misallocation literature of China. Hsieh and
Klenow (2009) documented that there is substantial static misallocation in China’s
firm-level data. Several papers, Brandt, Tombe, and Zhu (2013), Tombe and Zhu
(2015), Brandt, Kambourov, and Storesletten (2016) and Bai, Lu, and Tian (2016)
among many others, proposed explanations of financial frictions, entry costs and
trade and migration costs to account for the misallocation. With no intent to pro-
vide any explanation of misallocation, this paper provides a dynamic lens to look
at China’s misallocation and how it is affected by the left-censoring problem in
China’s data.
Although this paper works on China’s data, there are many other countries
whose firm-level data are left-censored. For example, the commonly used Chilean
and Colombian datasets have a cutoff of 5 employees. France, Italy and Argentina
also have a sales cutoff as in China (Bartelsman, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta,
2004). The results of this paper suggest that the left-censoring problem shall be
taken into account when carrying out cross-country analysis in the source of ag-
gregate productivity growth.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces measure-
ment of productivity and the methodology of decomposing output-weighted aggre-
gate productivity. Section 3 adds more relevant data details on top of Section 2.2 in
Chapter 2. Section 4 presents the direct aggregate productivity decomposition, tak-
ing CIES as the manufacturing universe. Section 5 proposes the method to correct
for the left-censoring problem and presents the corrected aggregate productivity
decomposition. Section 6 concludes.
4.2 Measurement and Methodology
Consider an economy with heterogeneous firms that has firm-level productivity zit
and market share θit in year t. Aggregate productivity is defined as market share
weighted average of firm-level productivity∑i θitzit. According to Baily, Hulten, and
Campbell (1992) and Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), the growth of aggre-
gate TFP growth from year t − τ to year t can be decomposed as:∑
it
θitzit −
∑
it−τ
θit−τzit−τ
=
∑
i∈stayer
θit−τ(zit − zit−τ) +
∑
i∈stayer
(θit − θit−τ)zit +
∑
i∈entrant
θitzit −
∑
i∈exiter
θit−τzit−τ (4.1)
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The first term, Technological Growth, in Equation (4.1) captures market share
weighted growth of productivity in stayers, which can be a result of exogenous
technological growth or endogenous productivity improvement from firms’ learning
(Jovanovic, 1982).4
The second term, Intensive Reallocation, evaluates whether relatively more pro-
ductive firms at time t gain market shares from t − τ to t.5 In an economy with
distortions, this reallocation of inputs could be slow and there are little changes
of market shares towards more productive firms. Therefore, this second term is
arguably smaller in an economy with higher distortions.
The third term, Extensive Reallocation, evaluates the aggregate productivity
gain from replacing less productive exiters by more productive entrants. This term
would be positive when entrants are more productive or are larger in market share,
or both, than exiters.
Because of the co-existence of state owned firms and non state owned firms in
Chinese data, I further decompose Equation (4.1) by ownerships:∑
it
θitzit −
∑
it−τ
θit−τzit−τ
=
∑
i∈SOE stayer
θit−τ(zit − zit−τ) +
∑
i∈NonSOE stayer
θit−τ(zit − zit−τ)
+
∑
i∈SOE stayer
(θit − θit−τ)zit +
∑
i∈NonSOE stayer
(θit − θit−τ)zit
+ (
∑
i∈SOE entrant
θitzit −
∑
i∈SOE exit
θit−τzit−τ)
+ (
∑
i∈NonSOE entrant
θitzit −
∑
i∈NonSOE exit
θit−τzit−τ)
+ (
∑
i∈NonSOE to SOE
θitzit −
∑
i∈NonSOE to SOE
θit−τzit−τ)
+ (
∑
i∈SOE to NonSOE
θitzit −
∑
i∈SOE to NonSOE
θit−τzit−τ) (4.2)
Within each ownership type, Equation (4.2) is the same as in Equation (4.1) in
decomposing sector level productivity growth into technological growth, intensive
and extensive reallocation. Extra terms come from the fact that some firms switch
4 Since I use revenue productivity as the productivity measure, productivity growth among stay-
ers can also comes from shifts of firm level demand curves. While interesting, this paper keeps an
agnostic stand about the source of productivity growth.
5In Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan (2001), it is further decomposed into a covariance term, and
a product of market share changes times productivity in t − τ: ∑i∈stayer(θit − θit−τ)zit = ∑i∈stayer(θit −
θit−τ)(zit − zit−τ) +∑i∈stayer(θit − θit−τ)zit−τ
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ownership status.
4.3 Data
This section introduces the productivity measure used in this chapter, and more
comparisons between entry and exit firms in the CIES and in the U.S. census data.
Most of the data analysis here builds on earlier data Section 2.2 in Chapter 2 and
Section 3.3.1 in Chapter 3.
Productivity Measure Firm-level productivity measure in this chapter zit is
computed as:
zit = log(Gross Outputit) − αllog(Total Wageit) − αmlog(Intermediatesit)
− (1 − αl − αm)log(Capitalit) (4.3)
for firm i at time t, with a constant return to scale Cobb-Douglas production func-
tion in mind. Shares of labor and intermediate goods, αl and αm, are the median of
firm-level labor and intermediates shares within 2-digit CIC industries.
Entry and Exit in CIES With the unbalanced panel constructed in Chapter 2, I
can identify firms that enter, exit and stay in the CIES data. Figure 4.2 plots num-
bers of firms from 1998 to 2007, as well as the entry (green) and exit (yellow) rates.
Entry rate averages about 24%, with an exceptionally high rate 60% in 2004.6 Exit
rate is also high and averages 15% over 1998-2007.
These values are much higher than the entry and exit rates in the entire man-
ufacturing sector. According to a survival analysis report by the State Adminis-
tration for Industry and Commerce (henceforth, the Report), exit rate in China’s
manufacturing sector is about 8%.7 While the total number of manufacturing firms
6According to Holz (2013), such a high rate could be a result of two facts. First, there is an
economic census in 2004 that has better coverage than normal years in the sense that firms who
used to under-report their sales are caught in 2004. Second, subsidiary firms who used to report
financial statements under one firm are separated in 2004.
7See http://www.saic.gov.cn/zwgk/tjzl/zxtjzl/xxzx/201307/P020130731318661073618.pdf.
I choose to rely on the exit rate in the administrative report, since estimates of the manufactur-
ing exit rate in China are rare and most studies are based on the CIES data. To the best of my
knowledge, there is one paper, Yang and Zhang (2009), that provides an alternative estimate of 9%.
This exit rate is defined as the fraction of firms who report a closing or a bankrupt status in the
Economic Census 2004.
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Figure 4.2: Entry and Exit Rate in CIES Data
0.00%
10.00%
20.00%
30.00%
40.00%
50.00%
60.00%
70.00%
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
T H
O
U
S A
N
D S
Number Exit Rate Entry Rate
Numbers are on the left axis. Entry and exit rates are on the right axis.
grows at 8% annually over 2004-2008, the entry rate in manufacturing sector is
about 16%. This highlights the importance of distinguishing the notions of birth
and closure of firms, from entry and exit in the CIES data. This can also be seen
from the age distribution for firms that are not in the CIES in t,8 and enter in t+ 1.
More than 75% of firms are older than 1 year among CIES entrants, and 90% of
them are older than 0 year.
Table 4.1: Percentiles of Age Distribution among CIES Entrants
Percentile 10% 25% 50% 75% 90%
Age 0 1 4 9 20
Aggregate productivity decomposition is usually implemented over 5 years (Baily,
Hulten, and Campbell, 1992; Foster, Haltiwanger, and Krizan, 2001). Table 4.2
illustrates the entry pattern of CIES data in sub-periods of 1998-2003 and 2002-
2007. Over 60% of CIES firms in 2003 and 2007 do not exist in the data 5 years
ago, and they produce a market share over 50% (see Table 4.2). Among them, more
than a half are older than 5, meaning that these firms already exist and have a
sales below 5 million in 1998.
These facts indicate that entry into the CIES data provides a biased estimate of
the entry of new firms in the manufacturing sector. As a result, the role of entry on
aggregate productivity growth could be biased. On one hand, incumbents who grow
8Ageit = Year t −Opening yearit
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from sales smaller than 5 million to sales greater than 5 million are misclassified
as entrants, and hence bias the entry channel upwards. On the other hand, there
aremissing new firms in 2003 and 2007 with sales below 5million and not captured
in the CIES data. This biases the entry channel downwards. The former is likely
to dominate because CIES entrants with age greater than 5 have a much larger
total market share than their counterparts with sales less than 5 million yuan.
Table 4.2: CIES Data Entrants over a 5-Year Horizon
China U.S. Average
1998-2003 2002-2007 1967-1972, 1972-1977, 1977-1982
Number of Firms, End Year
Data Incumbents 32.11% 24.37% 48.30%
Data Entrants (Age > 5) 29.06% 30.47% -
Data Entrants (Age ≤5) 38.83% 45.16% 51.7%
Market Share, End Year
Data Incumbents 50.86% 44.42% 83.10%
Data Entrants (Age > 5) 22.45% 24.85% -
Data Entrants (Age ≤5) 26.69% 30.73% 16.90%
U.S. numbers are averages of statistics over three periods: 1967-1972, 1972-1977 and 1977-1982
from Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988).
Table 4.3: CIES Data Exiters over a 5-Year Horizon
China U.S. Average
1998-2003 2002-2007 1967-1972, 1972-1977, 1977-1982
Number of Firms, Beginning Year
Data Stayers 40.67% 44.34% 52.00%
Data Exiters (Age>5) 36.66% 27.76% 48.00%Data Exiters (Age≤5) 22.67% 27.90%
Total Market Share, Beginning Year
Data Stayers 59.91% 61.23% 82.57%
Data Exiters (Age>5) 24.60% 27.01% 17.43%Data Exiters (Age≤5) 15.49% 11.76%
U.S. numbers are averages of statistics over three periods: 1967-1972, 1972-1977 and 1977-1982
from Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson (1988).
While one can distinguish between new firms and growing incumbents in the
CIES, it is impossible to distinguish whether an exit from the CIES is due to clos-
ing, merger or a decline in sales. Over 5-year horizons, about 60% of firms exit
from CIES data, which produce about 40% of market share at the beginning of 5-
year periods (see Table 4.3). Compared to U.S., the number of entrants and exiters
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in the CIES over 5 years are 1.5 times that in U.S. census data (Dunne, Roberts,
and Samuelson, 1988). However, because of the minimum sales, both entrants and
exiters in the CIES are more than twice as large as their counterparts in the U.S.
census data (Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1988). Therefore, if there is any
mis-classification that treats declining firms as closures, the productivity growth
from closing less productive firms is also biased.
Summary This section discusses several features of the CIES data. First, number
of manufacturing firms increases at a rate of 8% over 1998-2007, with a declining
share of state-owned firms. Second, CIES data only covers top 20% manufacturing
firms in the sales distribution. Third, there may exist a bias in extensive reallo-
cation, since growing and declining incumbents that cross the 5 million sales are
misclassified as entrants and exiters in the CIES.
4.4 Direct Decomposition in CIES
In this section, I take the CIES data as the manufacturing universe, and decom-
pose the aggregate output-weighted productivity growth into technological growth,
intensive reallocation and extensive reallocation, using the approach of Baily, Hul-
ten, and Campbell (1992).
To compare those results in Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992) and Foster,
Haltiwanger, and Syverson (2008), I divide the 1998-2007 window into two over-
lapping sub periods: 1998-2003 and 2002-2007. Table 4.4 shows that during these
two periods, output-weighted gross output productivity in the CIES increases by
17.61% and 15.57%, respectively. This translates into an annualized rate about
3.54 to 3.20%, and is close to the estimated gross output productivity growth 2.85%
for CIES stayers over two consecutive years in Brandt, Van Biesebroeck, and Zhang
(2012).
In the decomposition exercise, extensive reallocation through replacing less pro-
ductive exiters by more productive entrants is the main driving force of aggregate
productivity growth in the CIES. During 1998-2003, 93% of aggregate productivity
growth is accounted by the extensive reallocation. This number is about 144% in
2002-2007. The second engine of growth is from productivity growth for firms who
stay in data over 5-year periods.
Surprisingly, the reallocation of inputs among existing firms contributes nega-
tively to aggregate productivity growth. For both two periods, if I shut down exten-
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sive reallocation and technological growth, China’s aggregate productivity would
decline by 1.77 to 14.53% because of negative intensive reallocations. In other
words, among firms that stay in the CIES over 1998-2003 and 2002-2007, inputs
are reallocated to less productive firms rather than more productive ones.
Table 4.4: Direct BHC Decomposition in CIES
Tech. Growth Inten. Reallocation Exten. Reallocation Aggregate Growth
China CIES
1998-2003 0.0298 -0.0177 0.1641 0.1761
(16.90%) (-10.05%) (93.15%) (100.00%)
2002-2007 0.0768 -0.1453 0.2242 0.1557
(49.53%) (-93.32%) (143.97%) (100.00%)
U.S. Census
1972-1977 0.0504 0.0212 0.0001 0.0717
(70.29%) (29.56%) (0.14%) (100%)
1977-1982 -0.0109 0.0253 0.0095 0.0239
(-45.61%) (106.56%) (39.75% ) (100% )
1982-1987 0.1352 0.0315 -0.0105 0.1553
(86.50%) (20.15%) (-6.72%) (100%)
Percentages of contribution in aggregate productivity growth are in parenthesis. U.S. numbers
are from Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992).
The above results contrast to those in the U.S. manufacturing sector. According
to Baily, Hulten, and Campbell (1992), intensive reallocation increases 5-year ag-
gregate productivity growth by 2 to 3% across business cycles (see the U.S. panel
in Table 4.4). Extensive reallocation has a negligible role on aggregate productiv-
ity growth in the U.S., compared to its dominant role in China. The magnitude of
technological growth for the two countries are more comparable than the intensive
and extensive reallocations.9
The low intensive and high extensive reallocations are not accounted by the ex-
istence of state owned firms. Table 4.5 decomposes aggregate productivity growth
into technological growth, intensive reallocation, and extensive reallocation both
in the state owned sector and the non state owned sector, as well as from tran-
sitions between ownerships. Although there are differences in the decomposition
of growth between state owned and non state owned sectors, the contribution of
intensive reallocation remains small in the non state owned sector. Extensive re-
allocation and technological growth in non state owned sector are the two major
driving forces in aggregate productivity growth.
Onemay argue that the fast growing number of firms in the CIES contributes to
9One exception is 1977-1982 that includes the 1981-1982 recession.
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Table 4.5: BHC Decomposition in CIES Data, By Ownership
1998-2003 2002-2007
Agg. Growth 0.1770 0.1581
SOE Sector
Tech. Growth 0.0071 0.0106
Inten. Reallocation -0.0183 -0.0238
Exten. Reallocation -0.0871 -0.0605
Switchers
NonSOE to SOE -0.0006 -0.0006
SOE to NonSOE 0.0027 -0.0015
Non SOE sector
Tech. Growth 0.0150 0.0598
Inten. Reallocation 0.0067 -0.1124
Exten. Reallocation 0.2626 0.2209
the low intensive and high extensive reallocations in Table 4.4. Indeed, annualized
net growth rate of firms in the CIES averages 8%, much higher than the approx-
imate rate of 1% during 1977-1987 in the U.S. manufacturing sector. This may
lower intensive reallocation because more entrants take up more market share,
and thus dilute the market share of stayers at the end of 5-year horizons. As a
result, the intensive reallocation is low and negative because ∑i θit is smaller than∑
i θit−5 for CIES stayers, but not because inputs are reallocated to less productive
firms. To exclude this possibility, I redo the decomposition if (i) the net entry in
CIES is at the U.S. rate of 1%; (ii) the size of CIES entrants and exiters shrink to
that of their U.S. counterparts.
In the first experiment, I rank CIES entrants from the highest to lowest sales
during 1998-2003 and 2002-2007. I hypothetically treat CIES entrants below a
certain threshold sales to be nonexistent, which guarantees a 1% net entry in the
CIES.10 For example, during 1998-2003, there are 105,973 CIES entrants in 2003
and 79,440 CIES exiters. If the net entry rate in CIES is 1% as in the U.S., the net
growth in number during 1998-2003 would be the total number of firms in 1998,
143,595, times (1.015 − 1), i.e. 22,871 firms. This means that in a scenario of 1%
net entry rate, only top 86,765 firms above the sales 7.11 million in the sales dis-
tribution are treated as hypothetical entrants (see Table 4.6 Experiment 1 panel).
10The rationale is driven by models of endogenous entries, e.g. Hopenhayn (1992) and Melitz
(2003), where larger firms enter into production.
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Table 4.6: Hypothetical BHC Decomposition in CIES, Controlled for Net Entry
Rates and Sizes of Entrants and Exiters
Experiment 1: 1% Net Entry Rate as in U.S.
No. of CIES No. of CIES Hypothetical No. of Threshold Output of Hyp. CIES Entrants
Output of CIES EntrantsEntrants Exiters CIES Entrants Sales (thousand yuan)
1998-2003 105,973 79,440 86,765 7,111 98.48%
2002-2007 216,435 72,625 80,559 33,069 87.44%
Tech. Growth Inten. Reallocation Exten. Reallocation Aggregate Growth
1998-2003 0.0266 -0.0104 0.1612 0.1774
(15.02%) (-5.87%) (90.85%) (100.00%)
2002-2007 0.0726 -0.1122 0.1956 0.1561
(40.92%) (-63.20%) (110.27%) (100.00%)
Experiment 2: Entrants and Exiters Same Relative Size as in U.S.
Tech. Growth Inten. Reallocation Exten. Reallocation Aggregate Growth
1998-2003 0.0309 0.0334 0.0999 0.1642
(21.32%) (23.05%) (68.91%) (100.00%)
2002-2007 0.0827 -0.0720 0.1342 0.1449
(57.03%) (-49.64%) (92.62%) (100.00%)
Percentages of contribution to aggregate productivity growth are in parenthesis.
These firms produce 98.48% of output among CIES entrants. The top panel in Ta-
ble 4.6 suggests that the low intensive and high extensive reallocations are robust
to different net entry rates between China and U.S.. In both periods, the intensive
reallocation increases slightly but is still negative. In other words, there is not
much diluting effect on market share at least induced by more entries in the CIES.
The second is to control for the market share differences between CIES entrants
and those in U.S. census data. I hypothetically shrink the size of CIES entrants
and exiters to that of U.S. entrants and exiters. In particular, the relative size of
U.S. entrants and exiters is 0.21 and 0.23 (Dunne, Roberts, and Samuelson, 1988),
compared to existing firms. If CIES entrants and exiters had the same relative
sizes as in U.S. entrants, total market share of CIES entrants would be 25.96% in
2003 and 26.37% in 2007. According to Table 4.2 and Table 4.3, each CIES entrant
shall shrink its output to 53% and 47% of the observed level in 2003 and 2007,
respectively. Similarly, each exiter shall shrink its output to 63% and 58% of its
observed level in 1998 and 2002, respectively.
The lower panel of Table 4.6 lists the result of this experiment. It suggests that
there is a larger market share diluting effect because average entrant and exiter
are large. Intensive reallocation would increase to 0.0334 in 1998-2003, and -0.07
in 2002-2007, if CIES entrants and exiters have the same relative size as their U.S.
counterparts. Notice that in this exercise, all CIES entrants and exiters, regardless
of their ages, shrink in output. Thus, this puts an upper bound on the impact of
size differences between CIES and U.S. entries and exits, since the correct thought
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experiment shall only shrink entrants younger than 5 years old and exiters that
close if they could be identified from declining firms. Given this limiting case, the
low intensive and high extensive reallocations are not likely caused by the market
share dilution effect on stayers induced by larger entrants and exiters in the CIES.
Summary Taking the CIES data as the manufacturing universe, this section finds
a low intensive reallocation among existing firms and a high extensive reallocation
through net entry in China. This contrasts to the stylized facts of U.S., where
intensive reallocation is the main contributor of aggregate productivity growth.
This section also illustrates that the China-U.S. difference is not induced by
the diluting effect from more and larger CIES entrants that crowd out the market
share of stayers at the end of 5-year horizons. The canonical explanation by the
existence of state owned firms also cannot account for the similar low intensive and
high intensive reallocations within non state owned sector.
4.5 BHC Decomposition Corrected for the Cutoff
Sales
Because of the minimum sales in the CIES data, 80% of manufacturing firms in
China are not included in the aggregate productivity decomposition in Section 4.4.
This could mistakenly attribute some of the reallocation among existing firms to
net entry in the manufacturing sector, and hence bias the source of aggregate pro-
ductivity growth.
To quantify how large this bias is, this section first discusses the method to
correct the left-censoring problem and then repeats the aggregate productivity de-
composition. Second, I present the corrected decomposition results using the CIES
data and aggregate information in China Economic Censuses 2004 and 2008, and
compare to results in Section 4.4.
4.5.1 Methodology to Correct the Left-censoring
To correct the left-censoring problem, one needs to impute how productivity co-
moves with market share, as well as how productivity and market share change
over time for firms that are unobserved in the CIES. A dynamic firm-level model
(e.g. one based on Cooper and Haltiwanger, 2006) could serve this purpose. This
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subsection outlines an alternative approach that builds on the fact that the BHC
decomposition relies on a few key moments in market share and productivity.
To begin with, I rewrite technological growth, intensive reallocations and exten-
sive reallocations into parts that are observed and unobserved in the CIES data
separately. Following the same methodology as in Equation (4.1) for a 5-year hori-
zon, technological growth in the manufacturing sector can be decomposed as:∑
yit,.,yit−5,.
θit−5(zit − zit−5)
=
∑
yit≥yc,yit−5≥yc
θit−5(zit − zit−5) −
∑
yit<yc,yit−5≥yc
θit−5zit−5 +
∑
yit<yc,yit−5≥yc
θit−5zit
+
∑
yit,.,yit−5<yc
θit−5zit −
∑
yit,.,yit−5<yc
θit−5zit−5 (4.4)
where yit , . denotes that firm i operates in time t, while yit < yc (yit > yc) denotes that
firm i operates under (above) minimum sales yc. Note Equation (4.4) decomposes
three sources of technological growth: firms observed in the CIES at t−5 and t (first
term), and firms who decline in sales and fall out of the CIES over t− 5 to t (second
and third terms), and firms that are below minimum sales in t− 5 (fourth and fifth
terms). Only the first and second terms are observable in the CIES.
Similar to technological growth, intensive and extensive reallocations in the
manufacturing sector are re-written in the following Equation (4.5) and Equation
(4.6) ∑
yit,.,yit−5,.
(θit − θit−5)zit
=
∑
yit≥yc,yit−5≥yc
(θit − θit−5)zit +
∑
yit≥yc,yit−5<yc
θitzit
−
∑
yit,.,yit−5<yc
θit−5zit +
∑
yit<yc,yit−5,.
θitzit −
∑
yit<yc,yit−5≥yc
θit−5zit (4.5)
∑
yit,.,yit−5=.
θitzit −
∑
yit=.,yit,.
θit−5zit−5
=
∑
yit>yc,yit−5=.
θitzit +
∑
yit<yc,yit−5=.
θitzit −
∑
yit=.,yit−5≥yc
θit−5zit−5
−
∑
yit=.,yit−5<yc
θit−5zit−5 (4.6)
Chapter 4. Left-Censored CIES Data and Source of China’s TFP Growth 86
To compute equations (4.4), (4.5) and (4.6), one needs to impute moments of∑
yit<yc,yit−5≥yc θit−5zit,
∑
yit<yc θitzit,
∑
yit<yc,yit−5=. θitzit, and
∑
yit,.,yit−5<yc θit−5zit. I argue that these
moments and consequently the BHC decomposition in manufacturing sector can be
imputed under several assumptions about productivity, exiting behavior and firm
size distribution.
There are four assumptions needed for the imputation process I use.
Assumption 4.5.1. The deviation of firm-level productivity zit from economy-wide
average {µt}2007t=1998, zit − µt, follows an AR(1) productivity process:
zit+1 − µt+1 = ρ(zit − µt) + it+1 (4.7)
Assumption 4.5.2. Firms close exogenously with an annual rate χ. The rate is χcies
for firms above the minimum sales yc, and χbelow for firms below the minimum sales
Under Assumption 4.5.1 and Assumption 4.5.2, firms whose sales decline and
exit from the CIES from t − 5 to t have∑
yit<yc,yit−5≥yc
θit−5zit = ρ5
∑
yit<yc,yit−5≥yc
θit−5zit−5 +
∑
yit<yc,yit−5≥yc
θit{(µt − ρ5µt−5) + t + ... + ρ4it−4}
= ρ5(1 − χcies)5
∑
yit−5≥yc
θit−5zit−5 + ρ5(1 − χcies)5
∑
yit−5≥yc
θit(µt − ρ5µt−5)
+
∑
yit<yc,yit−5≥yc
θit{t + ... + ρ4it−4} (4.8)
, while firms that have sales less than 5 million at t−5 and keep operating at t have∑
yit,.,yit−5<yc
θit−5zit =
∑
yit,.,yit−5<yc
θit−5(ρ5zit−5 + (µt − ρ5µt−5) + t + ... + ρ4it−4)
= ρ5(1 − χbelow)5
∑
yit−5<yc
θit−5zit−5 + ρ5(1 − χbelow)5
∑
yit−5<yc
θt−5(µt − ρ5µt−5) (4.9)
Equations (4.8) and (4.9) show that it is important to consistently estimate
the productivity persistence ρ, average firm-level productivity {µt}2007t=1998, and shocks
{is}ts=t−4, for computing technological growth, intensive and extensive reallocations.
In particular, for firms that are observed in t− 5 and exit the CIES in t, it is crucial
to quantify the unobserved shocks {is}ts=t−4 when zit are unobserved. If these firms
exit the data because of low productivities, i.e. negative s, this suggests more
intensive reallocation in the manufacturing sector compared to that in the CIES.
Vice versa.
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Computing equations (4.8) and (4.9) further needs the sum of contemporaneous
product between market share and productivity. This sum of contemporaneous
product ∑yit<yc θitzit can be rewritten as:
=
∑
yit<yc
(θit − θ¯st )(zit − z¯st ) + N sθ¯st z¯st
=
N st ρ
s
θz,tσ(y
s
t )σ(z
s
t )
Yt
+ N st θ¯
s
t z¯
s
t (4.10)
where θ¯st (z¯st ) is the average market share (productivity) for N st below cutoff firms,
σ(yst )(σ(z
s
t )) is the standard deviation of sales (productivity) for below cutoff firms,
Yt is total sales in manufacturing sector, and ρsθz,t is the correlation between market
share and productivity for firms below the minimum sales. Since ρsθz,t is unobserv-
able, I approximate it by the correlation between market share and productivity
for firms in the CIES, i.e.
Assumption 4.5.3. Correlation between productivity z and market share θ, ρθz, is
constant over the distribution of sales y
Under Assumption 4.5.3, there are σ(yst ), z¯st and σ(zst ) in Equation (4.10) that
remains to be estimated, while θ¯st , N st , and Yt could be obtained from Census 2004
data. To compute σ(yst ), I impose the fourth assumption
Assumption 4.5.4. Log sales log(y) follows a Pareto distribution with density func-
tion f
f (log(y)) =

α(log(y)min)α
(log(y))α+1 if log(y) ≥ log(y)min,
0 if log(y) < log(y)min.
where log(y)min is the minimum log sales, and α is the Pareto shape.
The mean productivity for firms below the minimum sales, z¯st , is
z¯st = µt − (1 −
N st
Nt
)z¯ciest (4.11)
and the standard deviation σ(zst ) is approximated by that in the CIES data. 11
There are three steps to further compute the BHC decomposition. First, I esti-
mate the AR(1) productivity process to back out consistent estimators of ρ, {µt}2007t=1998
11This approximation is quantitatively unimportant, since the first term in Equation (4.10) is in
a much smaller magnitude than the second. This would be illustrated latter.
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and consequently {z¯st }2007t=1998. Second, I calibrate the parameters, α and log(y)min, for
Pareto distribution of log sales to match the mean and the variance of log sales in
the CIES so that {σ(yst )}2007t=1998 can be quantified. Lastly, I compute the correlation
between market share and productivity in the CIES, {ρθz,t}2007t=1998.
Estimating Productivity Process Due to the minimum sales, there is selection
of firms that remain in the CIES over two consecutive years. In other words, the
expected value of t+1 for firms that stay in data from t to t+1 could be non-zero. This
is important to quantify, since whether high t+1 firms stay and low t+1 ones leave
the CIES represents some efficiency in intensive reallocation. Therefore, OLS esti-
mation that assumes the zero expected shocks for staying firms is not appropriate
here.
To overcome this selection problem, I employ the following 2-step estimation.
Suppose firm i is observed in the CIES at t and t + 1. Formally, selection shows up
as
yit+1 = F(exp(zit+1), kit+1,mit+1, lit+1) > yc
= F(exp(ρzit + µt+1 − ρµt + it+1), kit + ∆kit+1,mit + ∆mit+1, lit + ∆lit+1) > yc
Changes of inputs ∆kit+1,∆mit+1, and ∆lit+1, could be a function of current level of
inputs kit,mit, lit, and current productivity zit, future innovations in productivity it+1,
as well as other unknown shocks.
Whether E(it+1|yit+1 > yc) is greater or smaller than 0 is not obvious. On one
hand, a higher shock it+1 increases productivity and sales at t + 1. This induces a
positive E(it+1|yit+1 > yc). On the other hand, firms with high levels of capital stock
kit, intermediate goods mit and labor lit, are more likely to maintain sales above the
cutoff regardless of a low innovation it+1.12 Thus, larger firms are more likely to
stay than small firms with the same shock, implying a negative E(it+1|yit+1 > yc).
This leads to an agnostic specification
log(y)it+1 = φ(log(z)it, log(k)it, log(m)it, log(l)it) + νit+1(it+1) (4.12)
where φ(·) is a polynomial of log productivity log(z)it, log capital log(k)it, log interme-
diate goods log(m)it and log labor log(l)it, and νit+1 is a (nonlinear) function of it+1.
Let ν˜it+1 be the demeaned νt+1. Since ν˜it+1 contains information of it+1, I proxy
12This argument hinges on some quasi-fixed property of inputs. If inputs are fully flexible, sales
yit+1 would be an increasing function of it+1 only.
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E(it+1|yit+1 > yc) by polynomials of ν˜it+1 , i.e.
E(it+1|yit+1 > yc) = E(it+1|ν˜it+1 > ¯˜ν(kit,mit, lit, zit)) = α1ν˜it+1 + α2(ν˜2it+1 − E(ν˜2it+1))
+ ... + αn(ν˜nit+1 − E(ν˜nit+1))
where ¯˜ν(kit,mit, lit, zit) is the threshold residuals for staying in the CIES at t+ 1. Note
the above polynomial specification guarantees that E(it+1|ν˜it+1 > ¯˜ν(kit,mit, lit, zit)) = 0
when ¯˜ν(kit,mit, lit, zit) = −∞, which is the no selection case.
Following the above rationale, I first run a Probit model: regressing an indi-
cator of firms observed at t and t + 1, 1(yit+1 ≥ yc, yit ≥ yc), on log sales log(y)it, log
capital log(k)it, log intermediate goods log(m)it, and log wage bill log(l)it, as well as
an indicator for state owned firms SOEit.13 Residuals from the Probit model νˆit and
its polynomial are then used as the proxy for E(t+1|yit+1 > yc) to augment the AR(1)
estimation. Specifically, I run the following regression
zt+1 = ρzt + (µt+1 − ρµt) + E(t+1|ν˜it+1 > ¯˜νit+1)+
{it+1 − E(t+1|ν˜it+1 > ¯˜νit+1)} (4.13)
where E(t+1|yit+1 > yc) is set to (i) α1ν˜it for a linear approximation; (ii) α1ν˜it + α2(ν˜2it −
E(ν˜2it)) for a quadratic approximation; (iii) α1ν˜it + α2(ν˜2it − E(ν˜2it)) + α3(ν˜3it − E(ν˜3it)) for a
cubic approximation.
Table 4.7 reports the result for the productivity process estimation. Under all
specifications of E(t+1|yit+1 > yc), the persistence of productivity ρ is about 0.664 and
slightly higher than that obtained from OLS estimation, 0.652. The average shock
it+1 for CIES stayers is positive for all years under linear and quadratic specifica-
tions of E(t+1|yit+1 > yc), and for some years under cubic specification (See Figure
4.3). This indicates that firms that stay in the CIES data on average have a higher
productivity level zit than those who exit. For the rest of the paper, I use quadratic
specification of E(t+1|yit+1 > yc).
The estimated shocks ˆit+1 for those observable CIES stayers help quantify the
shocks of unobserved CIES exiters who remain production. Specifically, by As-
sumption 4.5.2, firms who survive to operate in t and t + 1, below or above cutoff
13See Table C.1 in appendix for estimation results, as well as the Probit results when the depen-
dent variables also include quadratic terms in logyit, logkit, loglit and logmit and their cross terms.
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Figure 4.3: Average Productivity Shock ˆit+1 Conditional on Staying, t to t + 1
‐0.03
‐0.02
‐0.01
0.00
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
0.05
t to t+1
Linear Quadratic Cubic
Linear/ quadratic/ cubic means that E(it+1|yit+1 > yc) is approximated by a linear/ quadratic/ cubic
function of Probit residual νit+1.
sales, have mean zero shocks it+1 (unweighted and market share weighted), i.e.∑
yit+1,.,yit>yc
it+1 = 0 and
∑
yit+1,.,yit>yc
θitit+1 = 0
Therefore, for firms who exit from the CIES data and decline in sales, their average
productivity shocks, for both unweighted and market share weighted:∑
yit+1<yc,yit>yc
it+1 = −
∑
yit+1≥yc,yit>yc
it+1 and
∑
yit+1<yc,yit>yc
θitit+1 = −
∑
yit+1≥yc,yit>yc
θitit+1
By this property, the second and third parts of Equation (4.8) equals to
ρ5(1 − χcies)5
∑
yit−5≥yc
θit−5{(µt − ρ5µt−5)} −
∑
yit>yc,yit−5≥yc
θit−5{t + ... + ρ4it−4}
Since µt−ρ5µt−5 = µt−ρµt−1−ρ(µt−1−ρµt−2)− ...−ρ4(µt−4−ρµt−5) and µt−ρµt−1 can be esti-
mated from the productivity process estimation, ∑yit<yc,yit−5≥yc θit−5zit can be computed
as well as its impact on technological growth and intensive reallocation.
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Table 4.7: Estimating AR(1) Productivity Process
Linear Quadratic Cubic Linear(cont’d) Quadratic(cont’d) Cubic(cont’d)
Lag Productivity 0.665*** 0.664*** 0.663*** Probit Residual Cubic
(992.41) (991.44) (986.96) 1999 -0.304***
Probit Residual (-4.06)
1999 0.210*** 0.204*** 0.292*** 2000 -0.113
(32.84) (22.08) (12.35) (-1.49)
2000 0.187*** 0.142*** 0.175*** 2001 -0.0550
(28.10) (14.46) (7.05) (-0.75)
2001 0.183*** 0.0877*** 0.106*** 2002 -0.379***
(29.37) (10.54) (4.16) (-5.30)
2002 0.194*** 0.0627*** 0.175*** 2003 -0.518***
(32.31) (6.20) (7.44) (-9.64)
2003 0.146*** -0.0358*** 0.134*** 2004 -0.582***
(25.19) (-4.14) (6.83) (-10.35)
2004 0.0560*** 0.0704*** 0.266*** 2005 -0.452***
(7.09) (8.88) (13.00) (-9.54)
2005 0.178*** 0.0943*** 0.226*** 2006 -0.646***
(32.40) (13.75) (14.67) (-9.03)
2006 0.253*** 0.150*** 0.307*** 2007 0.284***
(38.29) (13.37) (14.84) (4.71)
2007 0.261*** 0.209*** 0.140*** Constant 0.148*** 0.148*** 0.149***
(38.72) (21.01) (7.91) (110.99) (104.88) (105.16)
Probit Residual Square N 1399406 1399406 1399406
1999 -0.0153 -0.139***
(-1.02) (-4.09) t statistics in parentheses
2000 -0.0980*** -0.145*** ="* p < 0.05 ** p < 0.01 *** p < 0.001"
(-6.32) (-4.12)
2001 -0.254*** -0.270***
(-17.23) (-10.53) Linear Quadratic Cubic
2002 -0.245*** -0.413*** corr(it+1, zit|yit > yc, yit+1>yc) -0.1158*** -0.0974*** -0.0109***
(-16.14) (-11.74)
2003 -0.371*** -0.579***
(-28.45) (-23.02)
2004 -0.242*** -0.367*** OLS
(-16.24) (-19.11) Lag Productivity 0.652***
2005 -0.235*** -0.410*** ( 976.53)
(-20.18) (-18.86) Constant 0.183***
2006 -0.179*** -0.550*** (170.29)
(-11.48) (-12.52) Year FE Y
2007 -0.101*** 0.0638
(-7.12) (1.69)
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Another result of the estimation of productivity process is to back out average
productivity in the manufacturing sector, {µt}2007t=1998, and consequently average pro-
ductivity for firms with sales less than 5 million yuan, {z¯st }2007t=1998 according to Equa-
tion (4.11). Unfortunately, only consistent estimators of {µt+1 − ρµt}2006t=1998 are attain-
able in Equation (4.13). To estimate {µt}2007t=1998, I assume that average productivity
{µt}2007t=1998 grows at the same rate as that in the CIES {z¯ciest }2007t=1998, which equals to
3.49% on average during 1998-2007. Results of estimated {µt}2007t=1998 and {z¯st }2007t=1998 are
reported in Table 4.8. It turns out that during 1998-2007, average productivity in
the CIES is 15% higher than that in the manufacturing sector, and 33% than that
among firms with sales less than 5 million yuan.
Table 4.8: Average Productivity for Firms whose Sales Smaller than 5 Million Cut-
off
Year µt+1 − ρµt Average Productivity Average Manu. Average Productivity
in CIES z¯ciest Productivity µt for Firms below 5 Million z¯st
1998 0.1710 0.5384 0.4050 0.3716
1999 0.1820 0.5586 0.4395 0.4097
2000 0.1489 0.6177 0.4734 0.4373
2001 0.1649 0.6488 0.4627 0.4162
2002 0.2304 0.6685 0.4717 0.4225
2003 0.2844 0.7335 0.5432 0.4956
2004 0.3022 0.7825 0.6446 0.6101
2005 0.2114 0.8174 0.7296 0.7076
2006 0.2931 0.8593 0.6950 0.6540
2007 0.8877 0.7539 0.7204
Average Growth Rate 0.0349 0.0349 0.0349
Pareto Distribution of Log Sales and Size-Productivity Correlation In
order to impute the co-movement between market share and productivity for firms
below the cutoff sales, I impose a Pareto distribution structure on log sales for all
manufacturing firms. I then calculate the correlation coefficient between market
share (size) and productivity for CIES firms, which equals to its counterpart for
firms with sales less than 5 million yuan by Assumption 4.5.3.
There are two distributions to be calibrated. One for all manufacturing firms,
and the other for firms with age smaller than 5. While the first is used for intensive
reallocation, the latter is for extensive reallocation.
For each distribution, there are two parameters, the Pareto shape α and mini-
mum log sales log(y)min, which are calibrated to match the average log sales and its
fraction of firms with sales above 5 million yuan. According to the CIES data and
2004 Census information, average log sales is 9.8792 in the CIES and the fraction
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Table 4.9: Calibrating Logy Distribution, All Firms and Firms with Age< 5
Moments Parameters Implied S.D. of Sales < yc
Average Log Sales Frac. Above yc α lnymin σ(ys)
All Firms 9.8792 79.76% 7.2533 6.8223 964.60
Age < 5 Firms 9.7747 45.63% 10.1781 6.7802 872.21
of all firms above the cutoffs sales is 80%. For firms younger than 5 years old in the
CIES, average log sales is 9.7747. Since the 2004 census does not give total num-
ber of manufacturing firms with age smaller than 5, I impute the number through
multiplying the total number of firms in 1998 and 2002 by 0.085, with a 16% birth
rate and an 8% closure rate annually. The fraction of firms in the CIES is therefore
the number of firms with age smaller than 5 in the CIES divided by the imputed
total number.
Table 4.9 shows the calibration results. For young firms, the distribution shows
a fatter left tail, indicating that there are far more small firms for younger cohorts.
Although there is a small difference between the two minimum sales (4.21%), the
two minimum log sales are roughly the same. Given these parameters, the esti-
mate for the sales dispersion among unobserved firmswith sales less than 5million
is 964.60 thousand yuan for all firms, and 872.21 thousand yuan for firms younger
than 5 years old. These two standard deviations are used in calculating Equation
(4.10).
Out of model fit suggests that the Pareto distributions match the average sales
of below cutoff firms and the truncated CIES log sales distributions well. In partic-
ular, the fitted distribution for all firms generate an average sales of 1.87 million
for below cutoff firms, which is close to 1.86 million yuan according to the 2004
census.
Further, I compare the histogram of log sales from the truncated Pareto distri-
bution to that in the CIES. Specifically, the Pareto is truncated at Log (5000) with
the same scale as in the CIES. Figure 4.4 suggests that the Pareto distribution
(transparent bars) fits the CIES data (pink bars) well, especially for firms with age
smaller than 5. For all firms, there is a larger mass near Log (5000) in the Pareto
distribution than that in the CIES.14
The next parameter for computing ∑yit−5<yc θit−5zit−5 (recall Equation 4.10) is the
14One explanation could be that firms tend to under-report their sales as suggested inHolz (2013).
I do find evidence along this line. In particular, if I plot histograms year by year, the closest match
between the real log y and the Pareto log y is in year 2004 when there is a better coverage because
of the census.
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Figure 4.4: Histogram Fit for Truncated Pareto Distribution vs CIES Data, All
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correlation between market share (size) and productivity, ρθz,t. Once again, there
are two correlation coefficients needed, one for all firms in computing technological
growth and intensive reallocation, and the other for firms younger than 5 years old
in computing extensive reallocation.
Table 4.10 suggests that there is a very small correlation between market share
and productivity, consistent with the misallocation story told in Hsieh and Klenow
(2009) in China’s data. Overall, the contemporaneous sum of productivity andmar-
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ket share are about 0.352 to 0.535 for all firms, and 0.0086 to 0.0133 for firms
younger than 5 years old.In particular, the first covariance component for firms
outside of CIES∑yit−5<yc θit−5zit−5, ∑yit<yc(θit− θ¯st )(zit− z¯st ), turns out to be fairly small and
averages 8.87*10−6, if I assume that standard deviation of productivity of these
firms are the same as in the CIES. This magnitude is much smaller than the over-
all sum of products betweenmarket share and productivity for firms with sales less
than 5 million. Thus, by looking at Equation (4.10), even if the correlation ρθz,t or
the standard deviation of productivity σst increases, say, by 10 folds, the fourth and
the fifth columns are unlikely to change.
Table 4.10: Correlation between Market Share and Productivity in CIES, and Sum
of Products of Market Share and Productivity for Firms Smaller than 5 Million
Sales
Correlation Sum of Products
All Firms Age<5 All Firms Age<5
1998 0.0185 0.0284 0.0352 0.0086
1999 0.0203 0.0270 0.0325 0.0072
2000 0.0166 0.0082 0.0338 0.0072
2001 0.0115 0.0012 0.0317 0.0078
2002 0.0110 0.0100 0.0337 0.0081
2003 0.0088 0.0145 0.0383 0.0095
2004 0.0069 0.0123 0.0394 0.0125
2005 0.0052 0.0244 0.0443 0.0123
2006 0.0007 0.0181 0.0497 0.0133
2007 -0.0052 0.0077 0.0535 0.0133
Closure Rate for CIES Firms According to Assumption 4.5.2, firms above the
minimum sales close at a rate χcies. Unfortunately, the closure rate χcies is not ob-
servable, since exiters in the CIES include both firms who close and those whose
sales go below 5 million yuan.
To get around this problem, I try several different levels for χcies, 0%, 2%, 4%,
6% and 8%. The upper bound 8% is the closure rate in the manufacturing sector.
According to the aforementioned survival report, the closure rate equals to 2% for
firms above 10 million sales, and increases to 4% for firms between 1 to 10 million
sales. Since half of the CIES firms have sales above 10 million, I choose 2% as the
benchmark case for the corrected BHC decomposition.
Note that the closure rate among firms whose sales are smaller than 5 million
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χbelow is
χbelow =
8% − Share of CIES Firms × χcies
1 − Share of CIES Firms
4.5.2 Corrected BHC Decomposition Results
Table 4.11 presents the benchmark results. For both periods of 1998-2003 and
2002-2007, the corrected extensive reallocation is 2 to 6 percentage points lower
than that directly computed in the CIES, while the corrected intensive reallocation
is 6 to 7 percentage points higher than that in the CIES. This implies overstated
extensive reallocation when the CIES is treated as the manufacturing universe.
The opposite happens to intensive reallocation. In particular, the contribution of
extensive reallocation drops from 93% to 74% in 1998-2003, and from 144% to 86%
in 2002-2007. Most of the drops are picking up by intensive reallocation in both
periods.
For technological growth, the change of direction depends on the period exam-
ined. In 1998-2003, corrected technological growth drops to almost 0, and con-
tributes only 2% to aggregate productivity growth. The opposite happens in 2002-
2007. Technological growth increases to 0.10. The difference between the two pe-
riods comes from the difference in productivity changes of declining firms who exit
from the CIES. It can be clearly seen in Figure 4.5 that declining incumbents expe-
rience more declines in productivity and thus contribute negatively to technologi-
cal growth in 1998-2003. This also suggests that there is a larger mis-attributed
intensive reallocation from the exiting channel in the CIES during 1998-2003.
Table 4.11: Direct and Corrected BHC Decomposition with χcies = 2%
Tech. Growth Inten. Reallocation Exten. Reallocation Aggregate Growth
1998-2003
CIES 0.0298 -0.0177 0.1641 0.1761
(16.90%) (-10.05%) (93.15%) (100.00%)
χcies = 2% 0.0031 0.0453 0.1373 0.1857
(1.65%) (24.38%) (73.97%) (100.00%)
2002-2007
CIES 0.0768 -0.1453 0.2242 0.1557
(49.53%) (-93.32%) (143.97%) (100.00%)
χcies = 2% 0.1021 -0.0754 0.1599 0.1865
(54.72%) (-40.43%) (85.72%) (100.00%)
Percentages of contributions in parenthesis.
Compared to numbers in the U.S. manufacturing sector, the dominant role of
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extensive reallocation in growth remains. This points to the key role of new firms
in China. From Table 4.6 and Figure 4.7, most of this China-U.S. difference comes
from the fact that top productive new firms are larger, rather than there beingmore
new firms in China. There also exists a large heterogeneity in sizes of new firms.
Although new firms in the CIES are large, an average new firm in the manufactur-
ing sector is imputed to be a fifth of its counterpart in the U.S.. Thus, outside of
the CIES, extensive reallocation barely contributes to the aggregate productivity
growth (see Figure 4.7).
The level of corrected intensive reallocation in 1998-2003 is higher than that in
U.S., and contributes a similar fraction to aggregate productivity growth. However,
this observation is not robust over time, unlike the U.S. case in which intensive
reallocation contributes more than 20% of growth across business cycles (Baily,
Hulten, and Campbell, 1992). In 2002-2007, the level of intensive reallocation is
-0.07, and still contributes negatively to the aggregate productivity growth as in
the direct CIES decomposition. Therefore, I conclude that the corrected intensive
reallocation is larger than that implied in the CIES, but still smaller than that in
U.S..
To further understand where the changes come from, Figure 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7 il-
lustrate how the corrected decomposition in the manufacturing sector differs from
that in the CIES, by looking at different groups of firms. To read these figures,
using the period of 1998-2003 in Figure 4.5 for illustration, one can first multiply
the first red bar, 0.0298, by the total gross output share of CIES firms, 0.9. This
is because the total gross output denominator of market share now includes sales
from smaller firms outside of the CIES. Then I add technological growth from de-
clining firms, -0.0339, and that from firms who stay below minimum sales, 0.0101.
This process finally gives the corrected technological growth for the manufacturing
sector, 0.0030. The blue bar is for 2002-2007 and reads similarly. So do Figure 4.6
and Figure 4.7.
The mis-classification problem in the CIES and the absence of firm with sales
smaller than 5 million cause quantitatively important biases on the strength of
technological growth, intensive reallocation and extensive reallocation. First, firms
that stay below minimum sales generate non-negligible technological growth and
intensive reallocation. For example, in 1998-2003, technological growth for this
group is 0.01, greater than that in the manufacturing sector (0.003). During the
same time period, the intensive reallocation of this group of firms is about 0.01,
which is about a quarter of the corrected intensive reallocation in the manufactur-
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Figure 4.5: Sources of Differences in Technological Growth, Direct CIES and Cor-
rected Manu.
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ing sector.
Second, a significant channel of aggregate productivity growth comes from in-
tensive reallocation between firms that grow and enter into CIES, and firms that
shrink and exit from CIES over 5 years. The magnitude of this channel is about
0.04 in both periods, which is about a quarter of the 5-year aggregate productiv-
ity growth. However, this channel is misclassified as extensive reallocation in the
direct CIES decomposition.
The above results are based on a hypothetical χcies = 2%. Table 4.12 illustrates
how each component of BHC decomposition changes when I vary χcies. When χcies
increases, the role of intensive reallocation in aggregate productivity growth in-
creases, while extensive reallocation decreases, aswell as the technological growth.15
Since the true closure rate of CIES firms is in the range of 2% to 4%, the true
intensive reallocation in the manufacturing sector is within 0.05 to 0.08 in 1998-
2003 and -0.08 to -0.03 in 2002-2007, while the true extensive reallocation is within
0.11 to 0.14 in 1998-2003 and 0.12 to 0.16 in 2002-2007. Similarly, the true techno-
15Since I hold the exit rate in manufacturing sector constant at 8%, more CIES firms close when
χcies increases, replacing those closing firms below the 5 million sales. This induces less efficiency in
closure and thus lowers extensive reallocation. The reason why intensive reallocation increases is
more mechanical. Recall that the declining incumbents enter into intensive reallocation in a nega-
tive term ∑yit<yc,yit−5>yc (θit − θit−5)zit. When χcies increases, less firms drop into the bin of sales smaller
than 5 million, and proportionally lowers the absolute value of this negative term. Therefore, in-
tensive reallocation increases.
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Figure 4.6: Sources of Differences in Intensive Reallocation, Direct CIES and Cor-
rected Manu.
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Figure 4.7: Sources of Differences in Extensive Reallocation, Direct CIES and Cor-
rected Manu.
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Table 4.12: Corrected BHC Decomposition in Manufacturing Sector, Varying χcies
Tech. Growth Inten. Reallocation Exten. Reallocation Aggregate Growth
1998-2003
CIES 0.0306 -0.0177 0.1641 0.1770
(17.30%) (-10.01%) (92.71%) (100.00%)
χcies = 0% 0.0046 0.0114 0.1672 0.1832
(2.49%) (6.23%) (91.28%) (100.00%)
χcies = 2% 0.0031 0.0453 0.1373 0.1857
(1.65%) ( 24.38%) (73.97%) (100.00%)
χcies = 4% 0.0017 0.0764 0.1098 0.1879
(0.91%) (40.66%) (58.43%) (100.00%)
χcies = 6% 0.0005 0.1050 0.0846 0.1901
(0.26%) (55.25%) (44.49%) (100.00%)
χcies = 8% -0.0006 0.1312 0.0614 0.1743
(15.24%) (49.79%) (33.45%) (100.00)
2002-2007
CIES 0.0770 -0.1453 0.2242 0.1559
(43.52%) (-82.11%) (126.68%) (100.00%)
χcies = 0% 0.1078 -0.1252 0.1985 0.1811
(59.53%) (-69.12%) (109.59%) (100.00%)
χcies = 2% 0.1021 -0.0754 0.1599 0.1865
(54.72%) (-40.43%) (85.72%) (100.00%)
χcies = 4% 0.0968 -0.0296 0.1244 0.1915
(50.54%) (-15.47%) (64.93%) (100.00%)
χcies = 6% 0.0921 0.0124 0.0918 0.1962
(46.91%) (6.33%) (46.76%) (100.00%)
χcies = 8% 0.0878 0.0510 0.0619 0.1791
(53.37%) (13.23%) (34.62%) (100%)
Percentages of contribution are in parenthesis.
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logical growth is less than 0.01 in 1998-2003, and around 0.1 in 2002-2007.
SensitivityDespite its seemingly restrictive assumptions, does the currentmethod-
ology successfully recover the BHCdecomposition in China’smanufacturing sector?
Although this question could not be answered directly without the census data, an
indirect way is to see if similar BHC decomposition results remain after correction
when the CIES data is left-censored at a higher sales cutoff. To do that, I choose
a new cutoff of 10 million sales and create a hypothetical CIES data that are trun-
cated at 10 million. In this hypothetical CIES data, I redo the direct decomposition
as if the data covers all manufacturing firms, and the corrected decomposition un-
der the same set of assumptions. Figure 4.8 shows that starting with the hypothet-
ical CIES data, the method recovers very close numbers in each component of BHC
decomposition. In particular, corrected extensive reallocation for the 10 million
data is 0.1304, close to 0.1373 in the CIES. For intensive reallocation, the direct
number is about 1.4 to 1.8 percentage points lower, reflecting a more severe mis-
classification problem. Yet, the corrected measure in the 10 million data is very
close to that in the CIES. Lastly for technological growth, the corrected number is
around 0 in 1998-2003 and about 0.10 in 2002-2007, regardless of the minimum
sales. Therefore, I argue that the method can reasonably correct the left-censored
data limitation and recover the true BHC decomposition in China’s manufacturing
sector.
Another robustness check is to see if similar changes of BHC decomposition ap-
ply to non state owned firms only. To do that, I drop all state owned firms every year.
Figure 4.9 suggests that a more severe bias exists if I take non state owned firms
in the CIES as the universe of all non state owned firms. In particular, extensive
reallocation is more biased upward (13 percentage points) in both 1998-2003 and
2002-2007, due to a relatively higher entrant-to-incumbent ratio in the non state
owned version of CIES.16 Similarly, intensive reallocation is more biased downward
(15 percentage points) in the non state owned sector.
The findings above are likely not restricted to China. According to Bartels-
man, Haltiwanger, and Scarpetta (2004), firm-level data in many countries is left-
censored by minimum sales or minimum employment. For example, two popu-
lar datasets in the trade literature, Chilean and Colombian datasets, only include
firms with employment more than 10. Countries like Korea and Venezuela also
16Entrant-to-incumbent ratio equals to number of CIES entrants divided by number of CIES
incumbents.
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Figure 4.8: Direct and Corrected BHC Decomposition in 10 Million Hypothetical
CIES , Compared to CIES
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Figure 4.9: Direct and Corrected BHC Decomposition within Non State Owned
Sector, Compared to CIES
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have firm-level data left-censored at employment of 5. For left-censoring in sales,
French data only includes firms with sales more than 2million Euro. This suggests
that when comparing channels of aggregate productivity growth across countries,
one needs to take the left-censoring problem in mind.
Summary This section finds that the direct BHC decomposition in left-censored
CIES data tends to overstate the role of extensive reallocation in China’s aggregate
manufacturing productivity growth, and understate that of intensive reallocation.
After correcting for the left-censoring problem, 5-year manufacturing aggregate
productivity grows at 18% for both periods of 1998-2003 and 2002-2007. Extensive
reallocation contributes to 74% of this growth in 1998-2003, and 86% in 2002-2007,
which are smaller than 93% and 144% in the direct CIES decomposition, respec-
tively. The decreased extensive reallocation is mainly picked up by the increased
intensive reallocation. During 1998-2003 and 2002-2007, intensive reallocation
contributes 24% and -40% to aggregate productivity growth, much higher than -
10% and -93% in the direct CIES decomposition.
Corrected results for technological growth are mixed, and depends on whether
firms exit from the CIES data experience large productivity decline. In 1998-2003,
corrected technological growth contributes almost zero to growth, while in 2002-
2007, this number is 55%. These contrast to 16% and 50% in the direct CIES
decomposition.
I also find that the method proposed here can recover similar magnitudes of
technological growth, intensive reallocation and extensive reallocation, regardless
of the minimum sales being 5 or 10 million yuan. Lastly, there is a more severe
bias in the direct BHC decomposition if one treats non state owned firms in the
CIES as the universe of non state owned manufacturing firms in China.
4.6 Conclusion
China’s TFP growth reaches 3.9% annually during 1999-2007 before the 2008 fi-
nancial crisis. This paper answers the quantitative roles of technological growth at
the firm-level, intensive reallocation of inputs across existing firms, and extensive
reallocation through net entry in accounting for this growth. Since the firm-level
data in China is left-censored at 5 million sales, this paper develops a new method
to correct the data limitation. The purpose is to understand whether the source of
aggregate manufacturing productivity growth is biased in the left-censored data.
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I first carry out the BHC decomposition in China Industrial Enterprise Survey
Data (CIES) 1998-2007, assuming that the data covers all manufacturing firms
in China. During 1998-2003 and 2002-2007, aggregate productivity growths are
17.61% and 15.57% in the CIES. 93% and 144% of these growths are from exten-
sive reallocation in the two periods, while -10% and -93% are from intensive real-
locations. The rest are accounted by technological growth at the firm level. This
result contrasts greatly to that in U.S. manufacturing sector, where intensive real-
location contributes robustly at least 20% of aggregate productivity growth across
business cycles. Meanwhile, the role of extensive reallocation in growth in U.S. is
almost 0. I find that a higher net entry rate and the existence of state owned firms
in China cannot account for such a difference between China and U.S..
The left-censoring problem in China’s data can partially account for the China-
U.S. difference. With several assumptions about firm productivity process, closure
behavior and log sales distribution, I propose a method to correct for the minimum
sales, and recover technological growth, intensive and extensive reallocations in
China’s manufacturing sector. I find that extensive reallocation is overstated in
the direct CIES decomposition, and the opposite happens to intensive reallocation.
There are two reasons for the result. First, firms that are below the 5 million cutoff
are neglected in the direct CIES decomposition, yet they contribute a quarter of
intensive reallocation in the corrected case. Second, firms that cross the 5 million
sales are mis-classified as entrants and exiters in the direct decomposition, which
overstates the extensive reallocation.
I further find themethod can reasonably recover the true aggregate productivity
decomposition in China’s manufacturing sector. Given a hypothetical minimum
sales of 10 million, the method recovers similar magnitudes of true technological
growth, intensive and extensive reallocations. The qualitative results of overstated
extensive reallocation and understated intensive reallocation in the direct CIES
decomposition also hold within the non state owned sector.
The method developed here is applicable to other countries of which micro-level
datasets are also censored, such as Chile, Colombia and France etc. Results of
this paper indicate that the censoring problem should be taken into account when
comparing the aggregate decomposition across countries.
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
During 1998-2007, China experienced its historically fastest growth in the indus-
trial sector when significant policy reforms including privatization and trade lib-
eralization take place. This thesis seeks to understand input misallocation and
aggregate productivity growth from reallocation during this time period, and pro-
vide several policy implications.
Chapter 2 finds that input misallocation are not restricted to the conventional
capital and labor misallocation in the literature. Intermediate goods, with its
74% of gross output revenue, are also misallocated across firms within industries
in China’s firm-level data. In fact, eliminating intermediate goods misallocation
in Hsieh and Klenow (2009)’s approach gives the highest gross output and value
added gains, compared to that of capital and labor. This novel finding invalidates
the value added approach in quantifying misallocation in the literature. Since
there exists input complementaries between capital-labor and intermediate goods,
value added approach ignores the extra gain by reallocating intermediate goods di-
rectly and indirectly through the complementarity. Potential explanations of inter-
mediate goods misallocation include pre-order friction and borrowing constraints
in intermediate goods.
Chapter 3 quantifies the role of pre-order and borrowing constraints on inter-
mediate goods in accounting for the measured gross output misallocation in China.
Quantitative results suggest that a model with both intermediate goods and cap-
ital frictions, i.e. adjustment costs and borrowing constraints, performs better in
accounting for misallocation than a model with only capital frictions. This chap-
ter indicates that intermediate goods, not only capital investment, could also be
distorted, causing output loss. This novel finding partly resolves the puzzle how
misallocation persists in a quantitative model with financial frictions in the liter-
ature (see Moll, 2014, Buera and Shin, 2013 for example).
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Chapter 4 decomposes aggregate productivity growth into sources of techno-
logical growth, intensive and extensive reallocations. The conventional wisdom
in the literature is that extensive reallocation drives the most of TFP growth in
the left-censored China Industrial Enterprise Survey (CIES) data. Yet, when one
takes the left-censoring problem into account, the role of extensive reallocation in
China’s manufacturing sector is overstated. In contrast, the intensive reallocation
of resources among manufacturing firms are stronger than what is implied in the
CIES data, although it is still worse than the U.S. case.
Results of this thesis point to several policy implications for China. First, finan-
cial market reforms could have a more profound impact on firm-level growth when
its impact on intermediates reallocation is also considered. This suggests that wel-
fare analysis of these reforms shall take the extra intermediate goods channel into
account. Second, a more sustained aggregate productivity growth needs a bet-
ter intensive reallocation of inputs across firms, when China transits into a lower
growth regime. Reforms along this line include financial market reforms as well
as the integration of domestic markets.
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Chapter 1 Appendices
A.1 SupplementaryDetails forChina Industrial En-
terprise Survey (CIES) 1998-2007
Table A.1: 2-Digit China Industrial Classification Code (CIC), Manufacturing
2-Digit GB/T 4754-1994 Changes in GB/T 4754-2002
13 Food processing N/A
14 Manufacture of foods N/A
15 Manufacture of beverages N/A
16 Manufacture of tobacco N/A
17 Manufacture of textiles N/A
18 Garments and other fiber products N/A
19 Leather, furs, down and related products N/A
20 Timber processing, bamboo, N/A
cane, palm fiber and straw products
21 Manufacture of furniture N/A
22 Papermaking and paper products N/A
23 Printing and recorded media N/A
24 Cultural, educational and sports goods N/A
25 Petroleum processing and coking N/A
26 Raw chemical materials N/A
and chemical products
27 Medical and pharmaceutical products N/A
28 Chemical fiber N/A
29 Rubber products N/A
30 Plastic products N/A
31 Nonmetal mineral products N/A
32 Smelting and pressing of ferrous metals N/A
33 Smelting and pressing of nonferrous metals N/A
34 Metal products N/A
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35 Ordinary machinery N/A
36 Special purpose equipment N/A
37 Transport equipment N/A
39 Weapons and ammunition manufacturing Merged into 36, Relabeled:
Electric equipment and machinery
40 Electric equipment and machinery Relabeled: Electronic and
telecommunications equipment
41 Electronic and telecommunications Relabeled: Instruments, meters,
equipment cultural and office equipment
42 Instruments, meters, cultural and Relabeled: Other manufacturing
office equipment
43 Other manufacturing New: Industrial Waste Recycling
Source: National Bureau of Statistics. There are four versions of Industrial Classification Codes.
GB/T 4754-1984 was used during 1985 to 1994. GB/T 4754-1994 was used during 1995 to 2002.
GB/T 4754-2002 was used during 2003 to 2011. The newest code system is GB/T 4754-2011 and
has been used since 2012.
A.2 Alternative Capital Share
This appendix introduces an alternative way of computing 2-digit industry capital share αsk and
corresponding measures of misallocation.
Imputed Capital Share αsk Within CIES data, rental rate of capital is unobservable and needs
imputation from elsewhere. I utilize rental cost information from World Bank Enterprise Survey
Data (WBES, 2011).
In WBES(2011), firms are asked
For fiscal year 2011, please provide the following information about this establishment by refering
directly to your income statement:
(1) Total annual rental costs of vehicles, machinery and equipment
(2) Total annual rental costs of land, buildings
Rental rate could be computed as a ratio of rental costs to total value of capital stock rented.
Unfortunately, only value of land and buildings rented is readily computable from WBES(2011)
from the following two questions:
1. Of the land occupied by this establishment, what percent is:
(1) owned by this establishment
(2) rented or leased by this establishment
(3) other
2. Referring directly to your balance sheet, at the end of fiscal year 2011, what was the net book
value, that is the value of assets after depreciation, of the following:
(1) machinery, vehicles, and equipment
(2) land and buildings
The median rental rate for firms that rent land and buildings is 8%. Assuming 9% depreciation
rate for general capital and 4% on structures, rental rate for capital is estimated to be 13%.
Given 13% rental rate, capital share αsk is computed as the median of firm-level capital share
13% × kisyis within 2-digit CIC industries. On average, capital share is 4%.
Magnitude of MisallocationWith this alternative capital share, I recompute magnitude of gross
output and value added misallocation by reallocating one input in Table 2.5. Results in A.2 suggest
that analysis in Section 2.2 is robust under alternative capital share.
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Table A.2: Dispersion in Marginal Products and Output Gains by Reallocating
One Input within CIC 2-digit Industries, Output Weighted, 1998-2007 Average,
with Imputed Capital Share
Intermediate Goods Capital Labor
All Firms
CV 0.63 12.84 3.74
Gross output gain 41.28% 2.37% 2.36%
Value added gain 175.15% 10.04% 9.94%
Private Owned Firms
CV 0.52 11.53 3.19
Gross output gain 36.75% 2.27% 2.29%
Value added gain 154.34% 9.57% 9.60%
A.3 Biased Value Added Productivity
Suppose firm i face distortion τi on intermediate goods. This distortion can come from taxes or
subsidies, or could be a reduced form representation of some constraints on intermediate goods
purchases.1 With observed choices of capital ki and labor li, firm’s choice of intermediate goods is
determined by the following static problem
maxmiexp(zi)k
αk
i m
αm
i l
αl
i − (1 + τi)pmmi
First order condition implies optimal choice of mi
m∗i = [
(1 + τi)pm
αmexp(zi)k
αk
i l
αl
i
]
1
αm−1
Given observation of m∗i , value added is
Y − m∗ = exp(zi)[ αmexp(zi)pm(1 + τi) ]
αm
1−αm k
αk
1−αm
i l
αl
1−αm
i
Therefore, log value-added productivity =
1
1 − αm zi
BiasTerm︷                   ︸︸                   ︷
− αm
1 − αm log(1 + τi) +
αm
1 − αm log(
αm
pm
)
If the distortion τi is positively correlated with zi, a high productivity zi firm could have a low log
value-added productivity. In contrast, a low productivity zi firm is labeled with a high value-added
productivity. Vice versa for a negative correlation between τi and zi.
1For example, financial constrained firms have a higher shadow price of intermediate goods than
pm.
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Table B.1: Constant Shares of Intermediate Goods and Labor
Year 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Labor Share (All) 6% 6% 6% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Labor Share (State-Owned) 7% 7% 7% 7% 6% 6% 6% 5% 5% 5%
Labor Share (Private-Owned) 5% 5% 5% 5% 5% 4% 4% 4% 4% 4%
Intermediate Goods Share 78% 77% 75 % 76% 76% 75% 73% 71% 70% 70%
Intermediate Goods Share (State-Owned) 77% 76% 74% 75% 75% 74% 74% 73% 72% 73%
Intermediate Goods Share (Private-Owned) 79% 78% 76% 77% 77% 75% 73% 71% 69% 69%
Table B.2: Growth in Mean Productivities in the CIES, 1998-2007
Year Mean Productivity z¯ Mean Productivity Relative to 1998 ∆z
1998 1.82 0
1999 1.84 0.02
2000 1.89 0.07
2001 1.90 0.08
2002 1.92 0.10
2003 1.97 0.15
2004 1.98 0.16
2005 2.04 0.22
2006 2.09 0.27
2007 2.12 0.30
Source: China Industrial Survey Data 1998-2007
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Table B.3: Gross Output Gain in Top 20% Firms vs Simulated All Firms, Bench-
mark
Simulated Period Top 20% All Extra TFP Gain from All Firms
0 1.01 1.09 0.08
1 0.95 1.03 0.08
2 0.94 1.02 0.08
3 0.95 1.03 0.08
4 0.95 1.02 0.08
5 0.96 1.04 0.08
Table B.4: Data Entry and Exit in Above Threshold Sample: Simulated Data vs
CIES Data
Model: Given One Birth Cohort
Years Post Birth No. of Firms in Data Data Exit Exit % Data Enter Enter % Enter-Exit
0 2246
1 3075 656 29.21% 1485 66.12% 36.91%
2 3862 860 27.97% 1647 53.56% 25.59%
3 4177 1232 31.90% 1547 40.06% 8.16%
4 4374 1264 30.26% 1461 34.98% 4.72%
5 1298 29.68% 1411 32.26% 2.58%
Data: 1998 Cohort
Years Post Birth Year No. of Firms in Data Data Exit Exit % Data Enter Enter % Enter-Exit
0 1998 5024
1 1999 7430 801 15.94% 3038 60.47% 44.53%
2 2000 9622 1031 13.88% 2888 38.87% 24.99%
3 2001 11886 1871 19.45% 3706 38.52% 19.07%
4 2002 12870 1425 11.99% 2395 20.15% 8.16%
5 2003 13308 1736 13.49% 2079 16.15% 2.67%
6 2004 15892 3017 22.67% 5567 41.83% 19.16%
7 2005 14749 2188 13.77% 1089 6.85% -6.92%
8 2006 14712 1238 8.39% 1183 8.02% -0.37%
9 2007 1155 7.85% 1083 7.36% -0.49%
Source: China Industrial Survey Data 1998-2007
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Table C.1: Probit Estimates of Staying in CIES Data in t and t + 1, All Years
Benchmark Quadratic
Log Capitalt 0.0380*** 0.237***
(35.89) (34.13)
Log Intermediatest 0.0174*** 0.0958***
(5.34) (5.29)
Log Labort 0.0820*** 0.0600***
(52.66) (5.82)
Log Salest 0.130*** -0.0753***
(37.13) (-3.90)
State Owned Dummyt -0.128*** -0.116***
(-39.71) (-35.25)
Log Capital Squaret -0.0166***
(-38.78)
Log Intermediates Squaret -0.00463***
(-4.63)
Log Labor Squaret -0.0162***
(-16.91)
Log Sales Squaret -0.00878***
(-5.29)
Log Capitalt × Log Labort 0.00210*
(2.04)
Log Capitalt × Log Intermediatest -0.0122***
(-6.23)
Log Capitalt × Log Salest 0.0160***
(7.55)
Log Intermediatest × Log Labort -0.00176
(-0.67)
Log Intermediatest × Log Salest 0.0110***
(5.40)
Log Labort × Log Salest 0.0255***
(8.88)
Industry FE Y Y
Year FE Y Y
No. of Observation 1614141 1614141
Correctly Classified 86.19% 86.19%
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